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This Article contains a critical discussion of recent studies by
Christopher Buccafusco and Christopher Sprigman concerning the
role of the endowment effect in intellectual property transactions.
According to the thesis presented in these studies, the existence of an
endowment effect in the markets for IP goods causes inefficiencies. In
order to counteract such inefficiencies, the authors argue, IP rights
must be weakened in various ways, including shifting toward liability
rules, adding formalities in copyright law, and expanding the fair
use doctrine.
The thesis as presented is groundbreaking and would have broad im-
plications. This Article, however, points out several shortcomings of the
thesis and its ensuing conclusions. To begin with, the experiments upon
which the thesis is based are not representative of real IP markets. To
the extent that the endowment effect as illustrated does characterize
actual IP transactions, debiasing through law is not an appropriate re-
sponse to this phenomenon. As demonstrated in this Article, heightened
valuations of IP goods are often driven by emotional attachment, mak-
ing such valuations fully consistent with the rational choice model.
Furthermore, this Article argues that over-optimism, another factor
that inflates the valuation of IP goods, is a phenomenon that society
should commend in the context of creative activity rather than con-
demn. This Article posits that the authors' proposed changes to the
current structure of IP law are not only unnecessary in order to ensure
efficiency in the markets for IP goods, but might, in fact, circumvent
the ability of our IP system to achieve its prescribed goals.
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INTRODUCTION
Criticism of intellectual property ("IP") rights is as old as the rights
themselves.' Even so, over the past decade, intellectual property laws have
been under heightened attack from multiple directions, with calls to weaken
legal protection awarded to creators and inventors becoming commonplace.2
I. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Good-
will in Trademark Lw, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 570-72, 589-92 (2006) (discussing early
criticism of trademark protection based on fears of monopolies); Susan Sell, Intellectual
Property and Public Policy in Historical Perspective: Contestation and Settlement, 38 Loy.
L.A. L. REv. 267 (2004) (surveying the history of intellectual property protection and de-
scribing, inter alia, the major historical controversies concerning copyright and patent
protection).
2. See, e.g., Irene Segal Ayers, The Future of Global Copyright Protection: Has Cop-
yright Law Gone Too Far?, 62 U. PITT. L. REv. 49, 86 (2000) (arguing that "[tioday, when
the 'authors' whose rights are being protected are large international multimedia corpora-
tions, expansions in copyright protection restrict and diminish the ordinary individual
citizen's access to literary and artistic works"); Julia Alpert Gladstone, Why Patenting Infor-
mation Technology and Business Methods Is Not Sound Policy: Lessons from History and
Prophecies for the Future, 25 HAMLINE L. REv. 217, 219 (2002) (arguing that the present
patent system "does not encourage new innovation but rather entrenches the monopoly rights
118
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In two recent articles, both by Christopher Buccafusco and Christopher
Sprigman,3 a new line of criticism of IP law's current regime has emerged.'
The articles, based on experiments conducted by the Writers, report the ex-
istence of an endowment effect in connection with IP goods. The term
"endowment effect" refers to the tendency of people in certain circumstanc-
es to value goods more highly when they own them than when they do not.5
Numerous experiments conducted in a wide array of settings establish that
individuals typically demand a higher price to give up an entitlement than
they would be willing to pay in order to purchase it. 6 The Writers argue that
their experiments extend prior research by showing that the valuation of IP
goods increases even more when the creator herself owns the good in ques-
tion; the Writers name such heightened valuation the "creativity effect." The
presence of an endowment effect and a creativity effect in the markets for IP
goods suggests, according to the Writers, that such markets suffer from a
high degree of inefficiency. In order to deal with the alleged inefficiencies,
the Writers propose several changes to IP law, including a shift away from
property rules and toward liability rules, the introduction of formalities into
copyright law, the expansion of the fair use doctrine, and a broader use of
doctrines vesting ownership of creative goods in some person other than the
creator.
of existing propertied patent holders"); Mark S. Nadel, How Current Copyright Law Dis-
courages Creative Output: The Overlooked Impact of Marketing, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
785 (2004) (exploring how copyright law's prohibition against unauthorized copying and
sales may, counter to the law's purported goal, have an overall negative impact on the pro-
duction and dissemination of creative content); Tom Saunders, Case Comment, Renting
Space on the Shoulders of Giants: Madey and the Future of the Experimental Use Doctrine,
113 YALE L.J. 261 (2003) (criticizing the narrow construction of the experimental use de-
fense in patent law); Andrew W. Torrance & Bill Tomlinson, Patents and the Regress of
Useful Arts, 10 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 130, 166-67 (2009) (presenting an empirical
study showing that the "orthodox" assumption that patents spur technological innovation is
not necessarily true).
3. Hereinafter, Christopher Buccafusco and Christopher Sprigman will be referred to
interchangeably as "Buccafusco and Sprigman" or collectively "the Writers."
4. Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property:
An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. I (2010) [hereinafter Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valu-
ing]; Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI.
L. REV. 31 (2011) [hereinafter Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity]. These articles will be
collectively referred to as "the Studies."
5. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and
the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1326 (1990) (describing the endowment effect as
"a manifestation of 'loss aversion'"); Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal
Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (2003); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Choice Be-
tween Property Rules and Liability Rules Revisited: Critical Observations from Behavioral
Studies, 80 TEx. L. REV. 219, 250 (2001); George Lowenstein & Samuel Issacharoff, Source
Dependence in the Valuation of Objects, 7 J. BEHAv. DECISION MAKING 157, 158 (1994).
6. See, e.g., Eric van Dijk & Daan van Knippenberg, Trading Wine: On the Endow-
ment Effect, Loss Aversion, and the Comparability of Consumer Goods, 19 J. ECON.
PSYCHOL. 485, 486 (1998); Kahneman et al., supra note 5, at 1332.
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Buccafusco and Sprigman's empirical studies of valuations attributed to
IP goods by their creators, owners, and potential buyers constitute a promis-
ing line of research. While I have only minor criticisms of the Writers'
empirical methodology, I disagree with their analysis and conclusions. As
demonstrated below, the data gathered in the Studies does not provide suffi-
cient support for the proposed weakening of IP rights.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides general background
with respect to the endowment effect. Part I also describes the experiments
conducted by Buccafusco and Sprigman. The remainder of the Article con-
tains a critical analysis of the Studies.
Part II argues that the Writers mischaracterize their findings. First, they
emphasize the uniqueness of their finding that the endowment effect exists
in the case of a good created by its owner, while in fact this finding was an-
ticipated by previous studies of the endowment effect. Second, they
emphasize their finding that an endowment effect exists in connection with
non-rival goods; yet, as Part II illustrates, the non-rivalry of IP goods hardly
played a part in the experiments conducted by the Writers.
Part III argues that the experiments underlying the Studies are not in-
dicative of the actual conditions in IP markets. While the experiments deal
with a very specific type of transaction-the assignment of an IP good-the
most common form of dealing in IP rights is licensing. Part III shows that in
the context of licensing, there is generally a much lower chance that valua-
tion anomalies will block the parties from agreeing on a price. Part III
further describes some other market factors that serve to mitigate any en-
dowment effects.
Part IV argues that even to the extent the endowment effect might char-
acterize IP markets, there is no normative case for debiasing through legal
intervention.7 There are two main reasons.
First, efficient allocation of an IP good is not necessarily dictated by
whether the good is located in the hands of the party who values it the most.
Therefore, even if endowment effects prevent certain transfers to parties
who most highly value IP goods, a change in IP law is not necessarily justi-
fied. In fact, from a dynamic efficiency point of view, such change may be
counter-efficient, as it may decrease incentives for the creation of IP goods
ex ante.
Second, an examination of the reasons for endowment effects in IP
transactions reveals that such effects do not necessarily reflect irrational
mistakes that require correction. In particular, this Article argues that emo-
tional attachment plays an important role in the valuation of IP goods and
shows that valuation driven by such attachment is consistent with the ration-
al choice model and, therefore, does not warrant debiasing. Furthermore,
7. Debiasing is the action of steering people in more rational directions by operating
directly on their behavior. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law,
35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 199 (2006).
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this Article argues that the over-optimism of creators-another factor that
seems to affect valuation-does not necessarily lead to inefficiency.
Part V contains a critical discussion of the remedial proposals made in
the Studies. This Article argues that these proposals fail to give due consid-
eration to certain negative effects that the suggested changes may have on
our IP system. This Article also argues that the recommendations are over-
broad and not sufficiently tailored to the specific problems they are meant to
address.
While embracing the general line of inquiry embodied in Buccafusco
and Sprigman's Studies, this Article refutes the Writers' conclusion that
their data effectively illustrates an actual problem that warrants a change in
current IP law.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Endowment Effect
Classical economic theory assumes that the value ascribed by an indi-
vidual to an item is endogenous and based on an individual's internal
preferences, which are not affected by whether the individual owns the
item.' Extensive research conducted in the social sciences in recent decades
has shown, however, that the initial allocation of an item does affect how
people value it.9 It appears that people tend to place a higher value on goods
when they own them than when they do not.'o As a result, individuals typi-
cally demand a significantly higher price to give up an already-owned good
than they would be willing to pay in order to purchase the same good." The
8. See, e.g., Eric van Dijk & Daan van Knippenberg, Buying and Selling Exchange
Goods: Loss Aversion and the Endowment Effect, 17 J. EcoN. PSYCHOL. 517, 518 (1996)
(pointing out that "economic theory assumes that preferences are not affected by owner-
ship"); Kahneman et al., supra note 5, at 1326 (noting that under the standard assumptions of
economic theory, "indifference curves are drawn without reference to current endowments");
Russell Korobkin, Policymaking and the Offer/Asking Price Gap: Toward a Theory of Effi-
cient Entitlement Allocation, 46 STAN. L. REV. 663, 667 (1994) (noting that "traditional
economic decision-making models assume that people form preferences independently of
whether they own entitlements").
9. Korobkin, supra note 8, at 667.
10. Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1228; Lowenstein & Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 158.
I1. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1771 (1998); Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1228; Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra
note 5, at 250; David R. Mandel, Beyond Mere Ownership: Transaction Demand as a Mod-
erator of the Endowment Effect, 88 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR & HUMAN DECISION
PROCESS 737, 737 (2002); Carey K. Morewedge et al., Bad Riddance or Good Rubbish?
Ownership and Not Loss Aversion Causes the Endowment Effect, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 947, 947 (2009). The endowment effect can also manifest itself as a reluctance to
exchange objects in one's possession for other objects of comparable dollar value. See, e.g.,
Kahneman et al., supra note 5, at 1341-42 (describing an experiment in which participants
endowed with coffee mugs were reluctant to trade their mugs for chocolate bars, whereas
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phenomenon whereby the minimum price that people are willing to accept
("WTA") to give up an item they own is higher than the maximum price
they would be willing to pay ("WTP") to acquire the very same item has
been termed the "endowment effect." 2
The endowment effect is considered "one of the most important and ro-
bust empirical regularities to emerge from the field" of behavioral
economics. 3 The effect has been studied extensively by social scientists.14 A
broad array of experiments using various methodologies has detected its ex-
istence in connection with many different types of endowments,' including
a variety of tangible consumer items,' 6 lottery tickets," governmental per-
mits," and even the right to enjoy open landscapes.'9 The existence and
extent of the endowment effect has proven to be context-dependent. 20 For
example, researchers observe that the effect is stronger when the good in
question is obtained as a result of skill or performance rather than as a result
of chance.2 1 A few explanations have been offered for why the endowment
effect exists22-including, most notably, loss aversion 23 and emotional at-
tachment24-but none of these factors account for the effect completely.25
Since the formulation of the endowment effect by social scientists, it
has become an important topic of discussion and application in legal aca-
participants endowed with chocolate bars were reluctant to trade their chocolate bars for cof-
fee mugs).
12. Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing, supra note 4, at 4; Mandel, supra note 11, at
737; van Dijk & van Knippenberg, supra note 6, at 486.
13. Lowenstein & Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 158.
14. See John K. Horowitz & Kenneth W. McConnell, A Review of WTA/WTP Studies,
44 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 426, 426 (2002) (surveying such studies).
15. Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1235.
16. See, e.g., Ian Bateman et al., A Test of the Theory of Reference-Dependent Prefer-
ences, 112 Q. J. EcON. 479 (1997) (exploring the effect in connection with chocolate bars
and cans of Coke); Kahneman et al., supra note 5, at 1332 (detecting the effect in connection
with coffee mugs, chocolate bars, and ballpoint pens).
17. See, e.g., Maya Bar-Hillel & Efrat Neter, Why Are People Reluctant to Exchange
Lottery Tickets?, 70 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 17 (1996); Jack L. Knetsch & J.A.
Sinden, Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Un-
expected Disparity in Measures of Value, 99 Q.J. EcoN. 507 (1984).
18. See, e.g., Richard C. Bishop & Thomas A. Heberlein, Measuring Values of Extra-
market Goods: Are Indirect Measures Biased?, 61 AM. J. AGRIC. EcoN. 926 (1979)
(detecting the effect in connection with hunting licenses).
19. See, e.g., Robert D. Rowe et al., An Experiment on the Economic Value of Visibil-
ity, 7 J. ENVTL. EcoN. & MGMT. 1 (1980).
20. Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1229.
21. Lowenstein & Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 165.
22. See generally infra Part IV.B.
23. Loss aversion is the tendency to view financial losses from a given benchmark as
more painful than forgone gains. See infra notes 154-174 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 175-182 and accompanying text.
25. See Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1229 (arguing that the explanation for the endow-
ment effect is "not well understood").
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demic literature.26 One of the most important implications of the endowment
effect for legal analysis is that it undermines the Coase Theorem.2 7 The
Coase Theorem posits that when transaction costs are low, the initial alloca-
tion of property rights will not affect their final allocation because efficient
transactions will occur, leaving property rights in the hands of the party who
most values them.28 The existence of the endowment effect, however, im-
plies that the initial allocation of property rights may affect the outcome of
bargaining even when transaction costs are low. Thus, in settings where the
endowment effect may exist, policymakers must take its existence into ac-
count when making decisions regarding the initial allocation of property
rights.
B. The Recent Experiments
Recently, Buccafusco and Sprigman conducted two sets of experiments
in order to examine the endowment effect in connection with creative
works.
In the first experiment,29 the subjects were randomly divided into three
groups: Authors, Bidders, and Owners. The Authors were told that they
would compete in a haiku-writing competition in which the writer of the
best poem would be awarded a $50 prize. It was explained to the Authors
that the Bidders would be given an opportunity to buy the Authors' chance
of winning the prize. Each Author was then asked to indicate the lowest
amount she would be willing to accept (WTA) to sell her chance. The Au-
thors were instructed that if the Bidder paired with an Author offered a price
higher than the Author's WTA, such Bidder would buy the Author's chance
of winning the prize. The Authors were further notified that they were ex-
changing only their chance to win and that the poem itself would still be
theirs. 0 Subsequently, each Bidder was shown the poem to which she was
paired and was asked to indicate the highest price she would be willing to
pay (WTP) to purchase the poem's chance of winning the prize. Finally, the
Owners were simply assigned to poems and asked to indicate their WTA.
26. Id. See also Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing, supra note 4, at 13-14 (surveying
some of the fields of substantive and procedural law where scholars have applied the en-
dowment effect).
27. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 8, at 664; Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 5, at 251.
28. Ronald. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcON. 1, 7-8 (1960).
29. The following description of the experiment is based on Buccafusco & Sprigman,
Valuing, supra note 4, at 19-25.
30. Id. at 20 (explaining that this reminder was meant to "help focus Authors' atten-
tion solely on the poem's value as an entry in the Contest rather than on any personal or use
value that they might attach to it").
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The results of the experiment showed a substantial gap between the
WTA of Authors and Owners and the WTP of Bidders.3' Surprisingly, no
significant gap was detected between Author and Owner valuations.32 The
results did not change notably when the experiment was repeated with "eyes
open," i.e., when instead of just being shown the poem that they were al-
lowed to buy or sell, subjects were shown all poems that would be
competing in the contest.3 3 The experiment was repeated one last time in
which the quality-based contest of the initial study was substituted for a lot-
tery and the subjects were informed that the winning poem would be
selected at random. 34 Once again, a significant gap between the WTA of Au-
thors and Owners and the WTP of Bidders was observed, though valuations
for each of the roles were lower in general than they were in the contest
scenarios.35
A second set of experiments, 36 conducted separately, was designed to
further examine whether transactions involving authors of creative works,
who are internally motivated, at least in part, and expend significant creative
effort on their works,37 will manifest a significantly larger WTA/WTP gap
relative to that produced by transactions involving mere owners. 38 The same
methodology was used, but the subjects this time were painting students at
an art school (hereinafter, the "Painters") who were instructed to choose one
of their paintings to submit to a contest with a one-in-ten chance to win a
$100 prize.39 The Painters were told that they would be matched with Buy-
ers who would make an offer to buy the Painters' chance to win the prize
and were asked to indicate the lowest amount at which they would sell their
chance to win (WTA). The Buyers, random law students, were each
matched with one of the paintings and asked to give an offer to purchase the
painting's chance to win the prize (WTP).4 0 If the Buyer offered an amount
equal to or higher than the Painter's WTA amount, the Buyer would buy the
31. Id. at 20-21. The average willing-to-accept (WTA) price of the Authors was
$22.90, the average WTA price of the Owners was $21.23, and the average willing-to-pay
(WTP) price of the Bidders was $10.38.
32. Possible explanations for the lack of such gap suggested by Buccafusco & Sprig-
man are: (1) the Authors were not internally motivated to create the poems but rather were
told to do so, and thus they acted without a "spark" of creative motivation; and (2) the
amount of creative effort in the study was small. Id. at 29.
33. Id. at 21-22. The average WTA price of the Authors was $20.18, the average WTA
price of the Owners was $23.95, and the average WTP price of the Bidders was $9.17.
34. Id. at 23-24.
35. Id. at 24. The average WTA price of the Authors was $18.92, the average WTA
price of the Owners was $15.98, and the average WTP price of the Bidders was $5.60.
36. The following description of the experiment is based on Buccafusco & Sprigman,
Creativity, supra note 4, at 36-40.
37. This is in contrast to the Authors participating in the first set of experiments. See
supra text accompanying note 32.
38. Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity, supra note 4, at 36.
39. Id. at 37.
40. Id. at 38.
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chance to win the prize. The Painters were assured that they could keep
their paintings.4' A third group of subjects, the Owners (also random stu-
dents), were assigned to specific paintings and, similar to the Painters, asked
to indicate their WTA amount.42
Similar to the first set of experiments, a significant gap was observed
between the Painters' and Owners' WTA and the Buyers' WTP. 4 3 This time,
however, the Painters' valuations were even higher then the Owners' valua-
tions." This shows, according to Buccafusco and Sprigman, "that
transactions in IP are also subject to a separate creativity effect-a valuation
anomaly, distinct from endowment effects, which may affect the way in
which the originators of creative works assign value to their creations."4 5
According to the Writers, the basic WTA/WTP gap observed in both
sets of experiments indicates that IP transactions may occur at a frequency
that is significantly suboptimal,46 while the separate creativity effect detect-
ed in the second experiment "further enlarges the gap that endowment
effects already create between the price at which creators are willing to
transfer their work and the price that buyers are willing to pay."47 In order to
account for the inefficiencies created by the observed effects and debias IP
owners, Buccafusco and Sprigman suggest several changes in IP law, in-
cluding: (1) reexamining IP law's general preference for property rules over
liability rules;48 (2) reformulating copyright's remedial provisions to limit
owners of unregistered works to the effective equivalent of a liability rule;49
(3) utilizing doctrines like fair use to allow secondary uses that otherwise
would not be permitted;50 and (4) "encouraging initial ownership of IP
rights in some person or firm other than the creator."51
41. Id. (noting that "[tihe Painters were reminded in bold that they were not transfer-
ring the paintings themselves or any rights in them other than the chance at the prize
awarded to the winning painting").
42. Id.
43. Id. at 39-40. The average WTA price of the Painters was $74.53, the average WTA
price of the Owners was $40.67, and the average WTP price of the Buyers was $17.88.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 32.
46. Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity, supra note 4, at 47; Buccafusco & Sprigman,
Valuing, supra note 4, at 4. By "suboptimal," they mean that fewer mutually beneficial trans-
actions will take place because of the effects than would take place in the absence of such
biases. Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing, supra note 4, at 4 n.16.
47. Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity, supra note 4, at 32.
48. Id. at 51-52; Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing, supra note 4, at 33-35.
49. Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity, supra note 4, at 50-51; Buccafusco & Sprig-
man, Valuing, supra note 4, at 36-42.
50. Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing, supra note 4, at 42-44.
51. Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity, supra note 4, at 49. This recommendation is
meant to deal specifically with the creativity effect identified in the second experiment. See
id. at 48-50.
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II. CRITICAL ANALYSIS: A MISSTATED
PRESENTATION OF THE RESULTS
In the Studies, Buccafusco and Sprigman emphasize the uniqueness of
their findings. They state that "no study has explored the existence of an en-
dowment effect for property that, like IP, (1) was actually created by the
Owners and (2) is non-rival (i.e., a good where consumption by one person
does not prevent consumption by another)."52 This presentation of the re-
sults appears to be overstated and somewhat erroneous. With respect to the
first prong, while it is true that the endowment effect has never been empiri-
cally tested before in connection with IP goods, various scholars in the field
have previously discussed it,53 and its existence with respect to IP goods
could be inferred from general studies examining the effect in other con-
texts. With respect to the second prong, it appears that the Studies fall short
of their stated purpose by failing to actually explore the endowment effect in
connection with non-rival goods.
A. Endowment Effect with Respect to
Goods Created by the Owners
The Writers emphasize the uniqueness of their finding that the endow-
ment effect exists in relation to a good created by its owner.54 They also
devote a separate discussion to the so-called "creativity effect"-the revela-
tion that the endowment effect exhibited by creators in relation to their
works is stronger than the endowment effect exhibited by mere owners.
52. Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing, supra note 4, at 4.
53. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics and the Droit Moral, 76
N.C.L. REV. I (1997) (discussing the endowment effect in connection with copyright law);
Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 7, at 220-22 (discussing the endowment effect in connection
with IP law); Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1253, 1259 (giving moral rights as an example in a
discussion of the endowment effect and discussing the endowment effect in connection with
the fair use doctrine in copyright law); Gideon Parchomovsky, On Trademarks, Domain
Names, and Internal Auctions, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 211, 223-24 (arguing that a combination
of the endowment effect and self-serving biases impair the sale and licensing of trademarks);
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 Nw. U.L. REV.
1165, 1194 (2003) (noting that inventors and designers might demand too much to license
their inventions, though not mentioning the endowment effect as such); A. Michael
Warnecke, Note, The Art of Applying the Fair Use Doctrine: The Postmodern-Art Challenge
to the Copyright Law, 13 REV. LITIG. 685, 701 (1994) (discussing the endowment effect in
connection with the fair use doctrine in copyright law). This is in addition to the references
listed (as exceptions) by the Writers themselves. See Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing, supra
note 4, at 15 n.85.
54. See, e.g., Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing, supra note 4, at 16. "[Olne area that
has yet to be probed is whether the endowment effect extends to goods that an owner has
created. In all previous experiments, the Owners have either simply been given the goods
that they are then asked to value or, occasionally, have done something to earn them. None of
the previous experiments asked subjects to actually create an object and then value it." Id.
55. Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity, supra note 4, at 32 (noting that "transactions
in IP are also subject to a separate creativity effect") (emphasis added). The presentation of
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These findings are far from surprising. The endowment effect is known to
exist with respect to a variety of goods,5 6 and the standard explanations of-
fered for its existence are applicable to creative goods as well.57 In fact,
there is every possible reason to believe that the endowment effect exhibited
by creators with respect to their works would be particularly noticeable.58
This follows from the general observation that the manner in which an own-
er obtains an object has influence on such owner's valuation of the object. 9
An important study conducted by Lowenstein and Issacharoff showed that
people who believed they had earned an object as a reward for good perfor-
mance assigned it a higher value compared to those who believed they had
obtained it by chance.60 The suggested explanation for the finding was that as-
sociation with the positive event of success underlying the reward added value
to the object.' If the endowment effect is known to be particularly strong with
creators' higher valuation of their works as a separate effect, entitled the "creativity effect,"
rather than as an enhanced endowment effect, is questionable. The endowment effect is
known to be context specific, and its intensity is dependent upon multiple factors. See gener-
ally Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1235-42. There is nothing in the manner in which the
underlying experiments were conducted that supports the conclusion that the creativity effect
is indeed a separate effect. Such hypothesis could be tested, for example, in an experimental
setting where the creators are positioned as buyers and asked to specify their WTP price. If,
in such an experiment, the valuation of creator-buyers would be higher than that of non-
creator buyers, then it may indicate the existence of a creativity effect that is indeed separate
from the endowment effect. Cf. Lowenstein & Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 162-64 (describ-
ing an experiment that proves the separateness of the "source-dependent effect" which, when
it operates in opposition to the endowment effect, may even neutralize it); see also infra
notes 60-61 and accompanying text (describing the source-dependent effect). Any observed
gap between the WTP prices of creator-buyers and the WTP prices of non-creator buyers al-
so may be an indication of the effect of emotional attachment on creators' valuations insofar
as such gap cannot be fully explained by an increased level of over-optimism on behalf of
creators. See infra Part IV.B. While the Writers' policy recommendations are not directly de-
pendent upon the classification of the creativity effect as a separate effect, such presentation
bolsters the alleged importance of the findings, which serve as the foundation for the far-
reaching arguments made in the Studies in support of weakening IP rights. For purposes of
this Article, I will often use the term "endowment effect" as a general term referring to the
heightened valuation of owners of IP goods, without differentiating between the "mere en-
dowment effect" of non-creator owners and the so-called "creativity effect" of creator-
owners.
56. Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1236. For examples, see supra notes 16-19 and accom-
panying text.
57. For a detailed discussion of such explanations, see infra Part IV.B.
58. Cf. Wendy J. Gordon, Trespass-Copyright Parallels and the Harm-Benefit Distinc-
tion, 122 HARv. L. REv. F. 62, 70 (2009) (stating that the endowment effect might be stronger
for works of authorship than for other objects, but noting the potential counter effect of the
ability to retain copies of such works for private use).
59. Nira Liberman et al., Promotion and Prevention Choices Between Stability and
Change, 77 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1135, 1136 (1999).
60. Lowenstein & Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 165; see also Buccafusco & Sprigman,
Valuing, supra note 4, at 10 (describing this study as part of their review of the literature re-
garding the endowment effect).
61. Lowenstein & Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 159. Similarly, association with a nega-
tive event of failure diminishes the value of an object. In such cases, the "source
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respect to earned goods (compared to goods obtained as a result of chance),
then it follows logically that the endowment effect with respect to goods
created by their owners would exceed the endowment effect of mere
owners.6 2 Creating a good is after all a particular way of earning it, and
association with the process of creation may very well increase the crea-
tor's valuation of the good. In addition, when it comes to "creative works"
per se-in contrast to other goods which simply happen to be created by
their owners, such as a piece of furniture assembled according to written in-
structions-there may be other factors that further increase the endowment
effect. These factors include an enhanced emotional attachment63 and the
creator's feeling that her personality is embedded in the work.' Further-
more, the inherent uniqueness of an IP good may trigger an increased
endowment effect than what would exist for an asset with readily available
substitutes. 65
B. Endowment Effect with Respect to Non-Rival Goods
The Writers purport to explore the existence of the endowment effect in
connection with non-rival goods.6 6 However, their experiments do not in-
volve truly non-rival goods.
A non-rival good is a good that can be used simultaneously by an
unlimited number of people without interfering with one another's use.67
dependence" effect would operate in an opposite direction from the endowment effect and
may even cancel it out.
62. See Michael I. Norton et al., The "IKEA Effect": When Labor Leads to Love (Harv.
Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 11 -091, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1777100
(presenting new empirical studies that demonstrate the increased valuation of self-made
products).
63. See infra Part IV.B.1.
64. See infra note 207 and accompanying text.
65. See generally Horowitz & McConnell, supra note 14, at 427, 436 (noting that or-
dinary goods have lower WTA/WTP ratios than non-ordinary goods); Korobkin, supra note
5, at 1238 (noting that experimenters have found that the endowment effect is more robust
for goods with no close market substitutes than for goods with close substitutes).
66. See supra text accompanying note 52.
67. James Boyle, The Public Domain: The Second Enclosure Movement and the Con-
struction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 33, 42 (2003); Patrick Croskery,
Institutional Utilitarianism and Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 631, 631-32
(1993); Nita Ghei & Francesco Parisi, Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Forum Shop-
ping: Conflicts Law as Spontaneous Order, 25 CARDOzo L. REV. 1367, 1392 (2004); Shubha
Ghosh, Deprivatizing Copyright, 54 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 387, 402-03 (2003). Non-rivalry
is not necessarily an absolute thing. Even with respect to a good that is generally character-
ized as non-rival, there may still be circumstances in which certain uses would interfere with
other simultaneous uses. This would be the case, for example, when a public road or park
becomes too congested. See David W. Barnes, Enforcing Property Rights: Extending Proper-
ty Rights Theory to Congestible and Environmental Goods, 10 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 583,
588-89 (1983) (discussing the concept of "congestible public goods," which are limited re-
sources in which consumption by too many people simultaneously ultimately interferes with
the benefit derived by each).
[Vol. 18:117
The Endowment Effect in IP Transactions
Non-rivalry exists with respect to a variety of goods including IP goods.68
For instance, multiple parties may use a literary work or a musical piece
simultaneously.69 Similarly, when one person is using a specific method to
manufacture a product, others may simultaneously employ the same method
in their businesses.
If the endowment effect were indeed found to exist with respect to non-
rival goods, this would be an interesting finding.70 Yet, in order to properly
test the endowment effect in connection with non-rival goods, the entitle-
ment changing hands would have to be the permission to make a non-rival
use of such good. For example, an experiment could be designed in which
the endowment is a non-exclusive license to make a specific use of a patent-
ed invention. If a WTA/WTP gap were detected in such experiment (despite
the fact that the subject positioned as the patent owner could keep using the
invention and licensing it to others even after the initial licensing transaction
takes place) this would indeed seem to be a manifestation of the endowment
effect in connection with non-rival goods. Such a finding would be surpris-
ing because the owner in this scenario does not need to relinquish anything
in order to consummate the transaction.7 1
However, the experiments were not designed this way. In fact, the non-
rivalry of IP goods hardly played a part in the experiments. The experiments
68. The combination of non-rivalry with non-excludability, which is the difficulty of
preventing others from using the good without paying, creates a "public goods problem"
with respect to IP goods, i.e., a potential for sub-investment in production due to the fear of
competition on behalf of free riders. This is, in fact, one of the main justifications for IP
laws. See generally Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences,
and the Provision of Public Goods, 108 YALE L.J. 377 (1998) (discussing the provision of
public goods); Ofer Tur-Sinai, Cumulative Innovation in Patent Law: Making Sense of Incen-
tives, 50 IDEA 723, 735-37 (2010) (presenting the "public goods" nature of IP goods as a
major justification for the legal regime of exclusive rights employed by IP laws). For the
non-rivalry of IP goods, see Boyle, supra note 67, at 42; Croskery, supra note 67, at 632.
69. The non-rivalry characteristic only applies to the underlying intangible work and
not to the particular physical embodiments of such work-e.g., a book or a CD-which can
generally only be used by one person at a time.
70. It should be emphasized that by non-rival goods I do not necessarily mean public
goods. In fact, the endowment effect does not seem to be relevant with respect to goods that
are not only non-rival but also non-excludable and thus constitute public goods. If a good is
non-excludable, it means that everyone can use it without the need for permission from any-
one. Such a good, then, could not be owned in the traditional sense. No one could charge
money for the good and no one would be willing to pay for it if they could get it for free.
71. As the owner is not expected to experience loss (or any other negative emotions
associated with a sale) in this scenario, she would be expected to charge what she sees as the
market value for the licensed use, which is presumably what would be suggested by prospec-
tive buyers. Still, there may be reasons why a WTA/WTP gap would nevertheless exist even
in such a situation, including anti-competitive motives (e.g., where a potential decline is ex-
pected in the patent owner's ability to make sales following the transaction); a decrease in
the value that the patent owner derives from her own use as a result of the simultaneous use
by the licensee (though, in that case, the uses are not truly non-rival); and different perspec-
tives of the parties on the licensed use's actual "market value," considering that there is often
no real operative market for the relevant use.
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were structured so that the good changing hands was the chance to win a
prize for the work, with the prize serving as a proxy for the entire economic
value of the IP right attached to the work.7 2 The fact that the use of an IP
good is non-rival in its nature has no relevance to such a transaction. The
chance to win the prize (the good evaluated by the subjects) was either re-
tained by the current owner or transferred to the potential buyer, but could
never be enjoyed by both simultaneously. Similarly, in reality, if one person
owns a copyright or a patent, others cannot own the same rights simultane-
ously.73
While describing the non-rival nature of creative goods, the Writers fo-
cus on the fact that the "transfer of rights in a creative work . . . does not
deprive the original rightsholder of possession of a copy of the work."74 Ac-
cordingly, they emphasize the feature of their experiment that allows the
Authors (in the first experiment) and the Painters (in the second experiment)
to keep their work even after selling their chance to win the prize. 5 While
the ability to retain a copy of the work might reduce the endowment ef-
fect 76-something that may be worth exploring in a separate studyn-it
certainly cannot be expected to cancel out the endowment effect complete-
ly." The good changing hands in the experiments was not the physical copy
of the work, but rather the financial prize, which represented the economic
rent collectible by the owner of the exclusive legal right to exploit the work.
As explained above, only one person can collect such rent, and this is true
72. See Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing, supra note 4, at 16 (explaining that for pur-
poses of the experiment, the value of an IP right was conceived as a probabilistic measure of
the right's likelihood of returning rents).
73. Others cannot even make certain uses of the underlying works unless the copyright
or patent owner licenses those uses. For discussion of license transactions, see infra Part
III.A.
74. Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing, supra note 4, at 15-16.
75. See supra notes 30, 41, and accompanying text. As explained therein, this was
meant to help focus the Authors' and Painters' attention solely on the financial value of the
work rather than on any personal value they might attach to it.
76. See Gordon, supra note 58, at 70 (noting that the ability to retain copies for private
use could undermine the endowment effect); see also supra note 71 and accompanying text.
77. The question of whether the ability to retain a copy of the work reduces the
endowment effect is tested in an experiment in which a comparison is made between the
WTA of an owner who is allowed to retain a copy and the WTA of an owner who is not al-
lowed to do so.
78. In most cases, the relative importance of the ability to retain a physical artifact em-
bodying a creative work or technological invention and use it for personal purposes can be
expected to be rather small compared to the ability to control all uses of the work or invention
and extract the economic rent from its commercial exploitation. As the Writers themselves note,
"[w]hereas property rights in real or personal property derive their value primarily from use and
exchange, the exclusive rights granted by IP law are, in essence, monopolistic opportunities for
rent seeking from other potential users and licensors, among others." Buccafusco & Sprigman,
Valuing, supra note 4, at 17. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARDA. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 17 (2003) (discussing rent seek-
ing).
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whether the owner retains a copy of the work or not. Therefore, the presence
of an endowment effect in the experiments should not come as a surprise at
all. 9 In fact, as the endowment at stake was the chance to win a prize, there
is little substantive difference between the Studies and prior studies that
have demonstrated the presence of endowment effects with respect to lottery
tickets.s0 The Writers acknowledge the similarity, justifying their experi-
mental design by noting that "IP rights function as weighted lottery tickets,
with the rights associated with high-quality works more heavily weighted
(and hence more valuable) than for those associated with poor-quality
works."8' The Writers fail to see that just as a lottery ticket would never be
classified as a non-rival good, so the chance to win the contest they created
has very little to do with non-rivalry.
As shown in this Part, the Writers both over-emphasize the uniqueness
and misstate the significance of their results, and the specific finding that an
endowment effect may exist with respect to non-rival goods is not supported
by the underlying experiments. The Writers' erroneous interpretation of the
results serves as a flawed basis for their recommendation to weaken IP
rights.
III. CRITICAL ANALYSIS: THE EXPERIMENTS ARE
NOT REPRESENTATIVE OF REALITY
As this Part will show, there are significant differences between the ex-
perimental settings designed by Buccafusco and Sprigman and the reality of
the markets for IP works. Thus, the results of the Studies are not indicative
of actual IP markets.
79. Admittedly, the endowment effect is expected to be smaller when an individual
evaluates an entitlement for its exchange value rather than its use value. See, e.g., Korobkin,
supra note 5, at 1239. However, the endowment effect may still exist, at least where ex-
change rates are uncertain, as in the current case (both in the experiment and in reality). See,
e.g., van Dijk & van Knippenberg, supra note 6, at 486; van Dijk & van Knippenberg, supra
note 8, at 521.
80. Bar-Hillel & Neter, supra note 17; Knetsch & Sinden, supra note 17. The main
difference between these scenarios is that unlike a lottery ticket, which has no intrinsic value
following the distribution of the prize, creative works presumably retain an intrinsic value for
their owners. In addition, some sellers in the experiments-particularly in the second set-
may have even envisioned a possibility of further commercializing the work following the
experiment. The sellers were not explicitly forbidden to do so by the experimenters (who
must have not contemplated such further commercialization plans by the owners, as the prize
was designed to serve as a proxy for the entire economic value represented by the work). See
Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing, supra note 4, at 16. Nevertheless, as explained above, this
feature of the experiment could not be expected to cancel the endowment effect with respect
to the prize itself, even if it could potentially decrease it. See supra notes 76-79 and accom-
panying text.
81. Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing, supra note 4, at 16.
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A. Assignments vs. Licenses
There is a gap between the narrow scope of the Writers' experiments
and the broad policy recommendations they make in the normative part of
the Studies. The monetary prize offered to the participants in the Studies
was designed to serve as a proxy for the entire economic value of the IP
right attached to the work.82 Thus, the experiments are directly relevant to
only a specific type of IP transaction-a complete assignment of an IP right.
In reality, an IP owner has the option to engage in one or a few of a variety
of transactions with respect to her right. She may choose, for example, to
assign only a part of her right.83 The most common form of dealing in IP
rights is licensing. 4 While an assignment is a complete transfer of owner-
ship in which the assignor relinquishes all interest in the IP right,85 in a
license transaction, the licensor retains a proprietary interest in the IP right
and the licensee is merely granted permission to carry out specified activi-
ties with respect to the work.16
The experimental setting was modeled after an assignment transac-
tion.87 If the conclusions were stated accordingly, this would not be
problematic. However, this is not the case. For example, when Buccafusco
and Sprigman recommend revisiting IP law's preference for strong property
rules,88 their discussion is based on the hypothesis that the WTA/WTP gap
observed in their Studies characterizes a range of IP transactions, including
license transactions. 89 It seems that the Writers either fail to notice that their
experimental design is very limited in scope or make an implicit assumption
82. See Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing, supra note 4, at 16. Said monetary prize
was designed so that it represents the entire probabilistic value of the rents that could be ob-
tained from holding the right to the work. See, e.g., Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing, supra
note 4, at 17-18; see also supra text accompanying note 79.
83. See, e.g., Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255-56 (1891) (explaining that a
patentee may assign the whole patent, an undivided part or share of the patent, or the exclu-
sive right under the patent within a specified geographical area); LIONEL BENTLY & BRAD
SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 262 (3rd ed. 2009) (noting that copyright law al-
lows partial assignments by reference to "times, territories and classes of conduct").
84. See, e.g., PAUL TORREMANS, HOLYOAK AND TORREMANS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAw 105 (6th ed. 2010) (noting with respect to patents that "[t]he most likely form of deal-
ing by the patentee is that he or she will seek to license out the patent by a formal agreement
that allows another party to work the patent without fear of an infringement action"); BENT-
LY & SHERMAN, supra note 83, at 264 (noting with respect to copyrights that "[t]he powers
conferred on the copyright owner are most commonly employed by the copyright owner giv-
ing licenses to particular individuals permitting them to carry out specified activities").
85. See, e.g., BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 83, at 262.
86. See, e.g., id. at 264.
87. See Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing, supra note 4, at 16.
88. See infra Part V.A.
89. Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing, supra note 4, at 34.
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that what they observe with respect to assignment transactions must be true
with respect to license transactions as well.90
Either way, the experiment is not representative of reality. Even if an
endowment effect were generally present in the context of assignment trans-
actions, this would not necessarily be the case with respect to license
transactions."1 Assignment entails a complete separation of the assignor
from her right, likely triggering the endowment effect according to all the
psychological explanations for its existence,92 including the loss aversion
account." In a license transaction, however, the owner does not separate
from the right, so she does not necessarily experience the same emotional
responses that account for the endowment effect. In fact, in contrast to the
experimental setting, in the case of a license transaction, the non-rivalry of
IP goods matters. An IP owner who enters a license transaction with another
person merely grants permission to this other person to use the IP in a spe-
cific manner, and unless it is an exclusive license, she can still make the
same use of the work herself and even continue licensing it to others. Even
in the case of an exclusive license, often there would be multiple uses of the
work not covered by the specific license and thus still available for the own-
er and others licensed by her. This would likely make the owner in the
licensing context less affected by fear of regret and other potential disutili-
ties of the transaction. 94
Moreover, while the owner of an IP right may often lack motivation to
assign her right,95 most IP owners are motivated to license their work, which
may make them more prone to settle for lower prices. 96 An IP owner who
90. See id. at 4 ("IP licensing markets may be substantially less efficient than previ-
ously believed."); id. at 42-43 (mentioning, as an example of a case where the endowment
effect may block an efficient transfer, a copyright owner of a musical work who demands an
irrational amount of money to license her song to another user who wants to use part of the
song in a new work).
91. Note that the argument made herein is not that the endowment effect can never be
present in license transactions, but rather that the Studies were not designed to explore the
magnitude of the effect in such transactions. In order to test the endowment effect in this set-
ting, an experiment could be held in which the entitlement changing hands is, for example, a
non-exclusive license to publicly perform a musical work. See also supra text accompanying
note 71.
92. For a detailed discussion of such explanations, see infra Part IV.B.
93. See infra notes 154-174 and accompanying text.
94. See infra note 164 (with respect to other potential disutilities of the transaction);
infra notes 165-174 and accompanying text (with respect to fear of regret).
95. An incentive to assign the right may exist when the original owner believes that
another person or entity is better equipped to handle commercial exploitation of the work.
For instance, songwriters typically assign their copyright to publishing houses, which man-
age all rights and royalty distribution. See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Faulty Math: The
Economic of Legalizing the Grey Album, 59 ALA. L. REv. 345, 390 (2008); Joshua Keesan,
Note, Let it Be? The Challenges of Using Old Definitions for Online Music Practices, 23
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 353, 354 (2008).
96. See generally MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW
1232 (1998) (noting that "[i]ndividuals license patents for a variety of reasons, including the
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does not assign her right may still be able to collect all the economic rents
attributable to the work by commercializing it on her own through
self-manufacturing and direct sales to end users or through licensing trans-
actions. Similarly, in the Writers' experiments, an Owner who did not sell
her chance to win the prize could still win the prize itself. In contrast, how-
ever, an IP owner who does not grant licenses to use her work may lose
potential income.97 Not all IP owners have the financial and other resources
necessary to manufacture their product or make copies of their work in a
large enough scale to meet the market's demand entirely on their own.
Those owners who are not capable of doing so in order to collect the availa-
ble rents must grant licenses to others permitting them to make copies of the
work and distribute them to end users.98 Furthermore, in some cases, the IP
owner does not have the expertise required to effectively make use of the
work in the manner contemplated by a specific licensee. For example, the
author of a book who holds its copyright may be asked to grant a license to
make a movie based on the book. As the creative skills required to make the
derivative work are entirely different than those required to make the origi-
nal work, the movie might never be made if the copyright owner does not
license the right to make the movie to another, thus foregoing a significant
source of income. 99 Similarly, an owner of a patent for a basic invention
may lack the ability to develop a follow-on invention, so if she does not
grant a license to develop such an invention, it may never be developed.'"
For instance, the expertise needed to develop a new type of fiber optic tech-
nology may be different than that needed to develop a new application of
such technology in a specific field, such as the telecommunications field.''
If a prospective licensee has a particularly innovative idea for such applica-
tion and the skills to develop it, then even if the licensing fees she offers are
lower than what was previously envisioned by the IP owner, the owner may
nevertheless go forward with the transaction because the alternative may be
inability to exploit fully the patented technology, a need to obtain access to another's patent-
ed technology via cross- licensing, or simply a desire for additional revenues").
97. But see Gordon, supra note 58, at 69-73 (arguing that because owners are likely to
be more vigilant in avoiding harms than in pursuing benefits, and because intangibles are
more open to harmless use by strangers due to their non-rival nature, the owners of intangi-
bles may not be as motivated to garner license fees from new users compared to the owners
of tangible property). Nevertheless, according to Gordon, over-confidence bias could coun-
teract the focus on potential harm. See id. at 72; infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing over-optimism
of creators).
98. See, e.g., BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 83, at 261.
99. Cf ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNO-
LOGICAL AGE 427 (4th ed. 2006) (commenting that "U]ust because someone is a successful
writer ... does not mean that he will be particularly successful at manufacturing and selling
plush toys").
100. As the courts have constructed the experimental use exception under U.S. law very
narrowly, such a license would be needed in most cases in order to avoid an infringement.
See Tur-Sinai, supra note 68, at 770-73.
101. Id. at 735.
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to completely give up the chance to make the profit associated with this spe-
cific type of project. IP owners, therefore, are normally expected to be
highly motivated to license their work.'02
On top of the economic incentives to enter into license transactions,
many creators may also be motivated by the desire to get published and ac-
quire a reputation, which may encourage them to compromise on the price
offered for uses of their work. Altogether, such strong motivations to license
may lead IP owners to show more flexibility and willingness to settle for
lower prices when negotiating deals with potential licensees. This intuitive
understanding is supported by a study conducted by Mandel. 03 In the study,
Mandel explored the relationship between "transaction demand," i.e., the
motivation to complete a transaction, and the endowment effect. His study
confirmed that owners would be more inclined to sell at lower prices as the
transaction demand increased.0"
In addition, actual licensees would likely demonstrate a higher transac-
tion demand than the random "buyers" in the Writers' experiments given
their position as consumers in search of a specific product. A potential au-
thor who needs to use a copyrighted work for a creative endeavor or an
inventor who needs to use a patented invention as a research tool to develop
a follow-on invention is likely willing to pay a higher price for a license
than a random subject who is merely gambling on a chance to win a finan-
cial prize. 05
Thus, the endowment effect in itself is not likely to constitute a major
obstacle in the context of license transactions. Though there are contexts in
which parties to license transactions must overcome significant hurdles in
order to come to an agreement,0 6 they will often be able to overcome valua-
tion anomalies.
102. An exceptional case would be an IP owner who prefers to remain the sole user of
the relevant work. For example, the owner of a patent for a technological process that de-
creases the production costs of a certain product she manufactures may have no desire to
license such technology to others, as she might prefer to keep using the process exclusively
in order to maintain a significant competitive advantage. Another case where licenses do not
play a significant role is certain works of fine art that only exist in a single copy. As the non-
rivalry characteristic does not apply to such works, licensing is largely irrelevant.
103. Mandel, supra note 11.
104. Id. at 737-38. Similarly, as transaction demand increases, potential buyers would
be more inclined to pay higher prices. Id.; cf Liberman et al., supra note 59 (showing that a
"promotion focus," in contrast to a "prevention focus," lowers the endowment effect).
105. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing the connection between
buyers' transaction demand and their willingness to pay higher prices).
106. See, e.g., Tur-Sinai, supra note 68, at 750-51 (describing the particularly high
transaction costs characterizing licensing transactions between cumulative inventors).
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B. Other Factors that Are Likely to Mitigate
the Endowment Effect in Reality
There are additional factors, unexplored in the Studies, that are likely to
mitigate the endowment effect in any IP transaction.
In light of high "transaction demand," a potential "buyer"-an assignee
or licensee of an IP good, and particularly the person who might best exploit
such good, who should be the focus of our inquiry according to the Writ-
ers 07-will often be willing to pay much more than the random subjects
who participated in the Studies. Such a "buyer" presumably knows the mar-
ket well and is in a position to exploit the asset in a profitable manner. Often
the "buyer" would only contemplate the transaction if she has access to su-
perior manufacturing abilities or particularly efficient marketing channels
that make her confident in her ability to benefit from the transaction.
Another important difference between the experimental setting and the
reality of IP markets is the ability to bargain. In the experiments, no bargain-
ing between the subjects was allowed. Each subject indicated her price in an
isolated manner and was not even given a chance to reevaluate it in response
to the price specified by the other party. In reality, bargaining is in many
cases an option, and prices are often determined during the course of nego-
tiation. Throughout the bargaining phase, the parties often receive input
from the relevant markets, and every round of negotiation serves as a factor
in pricing decisions in the next round. This dynamic bargaining process of-
ten ends with the parties agreeing on a price between their initial offers.'o
Furthermore, while the experiments situated each seller against a single
buyer, in reality negotiations are often conducted in the context of potential
or real competition from other parties. 09 This reality may also increase the
number of instances where, despite an initial WTA/WTP gap, the parties
would nevertheless manage to close a deal.I 0
To summarize, the results of the experiments, isolated and non-
representative of the reality of IP markets, do not suggest a market failure
107. See infra Part IV.A.
108. See also infra notes 237-238 and accompanying text.
109. Such competition often exists even on the supply side despite the inherent unique-
ness of creative goods. A person who wishes to use a copyrighted work for a certain
purpose-i.e., incorporate a certain graphic image into her website-may often be able to
settle for a close substitute. Even patents do not necessarily confer market power upon their
owners. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 247, 249 (1994); Edmund W. Kitch, Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights?, 8
RES. L. & EcON. 31 (1986); Edmund W. Kitch, Taking Stock: The Law and Economics of In-
tellectual Property Rights: Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1729-38 (2000); Jordan P. Karp, Note, Exper-
imental Use as Patent Infringement: The Impropriety of a Broad Exception, 100 YALE L.J.
2169, 2185 (1991).
110. See generally Arlen, supra note 11, at 1769, 1777 (noting that biases may be mut-
ed or altered by market forces).
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that would prevent transfers that would normally occur but for the endow-
ment effect.
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS: No JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERVENTION
Even assuming that the Writers are correct and that a WTAIWTP gap
extends beyond their limited experimental setting to markets for IP goods,
this Part argues that this finding would not constitute sufficient grounds for
debiasing through legal intervention. First, the supposed need to ensure that
a good reaches the hands of the party who values it the most, a foundational
notion underlying Buccafusco and Sprigman's call for debiasing, is not real-
ly applicable in the world of intellectual property. There are, in fact, other
important factors relevant to allocation decisions in intellectual property that
are largely overlooked in the Studies. Second, an examination of the reasons
for the endowment effect in IP transactions, to the extent it exists, shows
that the high valuations of owners are not simply mistakes but may rather be
based on legitimate reasons that do not warrant legal intervention.
A. What Constitutes an Efficient Allocation in IP Law?
Buccafusco and Sprigman's recommendations are based on the policy
goal of facilitating the transfer of IP goods to those who might best exploit
them."' Their basic argument is that since there are market failures, as illus-
trated by their experiments, such IP transfers only take place in a
sub-optimal percentage of cases and, therefore, legal intervention is war-
ranted.
An argument of this type is commonly made in law and economics
literature. It is a general presumption of economics that a good is allocated
efficiently if it is possessed by the claimant who values it the most and can
extract the greatest utility from it."' The Coase Theorem posits that in the
11. See, e.g., Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity, supra note 4, at 34 (expressing con-
cern that the endowment effect would impede efficient transacting and thus perpetuate initial
inefficient property distributions); id. at 46 ("IP rights are rarely given initially to the party
best able to exploit them."); Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing, supra note 4, at 17 (noting
that the assumptions underlying the Coase Theorem would not hold true if endowment ef-
fects were found to exist in the markets for creative goods and expressing concern that
"instead of the right reliably ending up in the hands of the party that will use it most effi-
ciently, it is much more likely that the party that is initially assigned the right will retain it").
112. See RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 11 (4th ed. 1992) (noting
that "tw]hen resources are used where their value is highest, we may say that they are being
employed efficiently"); see also Korobkin, supra note 8, at 663 (noting that when a legat rule
allocates resources to the party who values them most, economists say that the rule promotes
efficiency); Michael I. Swygert & Katherine Earle Yanes, A Primer on the Coase Theorem:
Making Law in a World of Zero Transaction Costs, 11 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 1, 11 (explaining
that market exchanges promote efficiency because they "enable resources to move into the
hands of those who value them most" and noting that such users "who value resources at
higher levels do so because they can extract a greater productivity from these resources than
can the former owners").
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absence of transaction costs, it makes no difference from an efficiency
perspective who initially receives a legal entitlement because, regardless of
the initial allocation, a series of exchanges will take place until the party
with the highest value for the entitlement owns it." 3 If, however, high trans-
action costs prevent the "highest value user" from purchasing an entitlement
in the free market, policymakers must initially allocate the entitlement to
such a party.114 The endowment effect can have an effect similar to that of
transaction costs because in its presence entitlements will not change hands
in the free market as often as the Coase Theorem predicts." 5 Thus, the
common economic argument asserts that the presence of an endowment ef-
fect in a specific setting justifies legal intervention to ensure efficient
allocation of the entitlement. This can be accomplished either by initially al-
locating the entitlement to the party who values it the most or by
encouraging the efficient transfers of the entitlement that would normally
occur in the free market but for the endowment effect. The concern that the
endowment effect impedes transfers of IP goods to those who value them
the most forms the foundation upon which Buccafusco and Sprigman base
their recommendations."16
Yet, in the context of IP law, the general economic presumption that an
entitlement is allocated efficiently if it is possessed by the claimant who
values it the most is not really applicable. This consideration by itself is
generally not even mentioned as one of the relevant factors governing the
economic analysis of IP law."' Considering the non-rival nature of IP
goods, this is not surprising." 8 A tangible asset can only be held by one per-
son at a time, and thus, from an efficiency perspective, that person must be
the one who can derive the most utility out of holding such a scarce re-
source." 9 In contrast, more than one person can generally use an IP asset
113. Coase, supra note 28, at 7-8; see also Korobkin, supra note 8, at 664 (summariz-
ing the Coase Theorem).
114. Korobkin, supra note 8, at 664.
115. Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1229; Korobkin, supra note 8, at 664 (noting that the
endowment effect undermines Coase's invariance hypothesis).
116. See supra note 111.
117. For elaborate discussions of the various factors governing the economic analysis
of intellectual property law that do not mention the "highest value user" rationale, see, e.g.,
Dam, supra note 109 (discussing the economic principles underlying the patent system);
Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIEs 617,
638-43 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003), available at http://www.ssrn.com/
abstract=413001 (surveying the central economic considerations dominating the analysis of
intellectual property); A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Theory of Patents-The Not-Quite-Holy
Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 267, 269-70 (1996) (outlining the various economic theories
developed over the years in an attempt to describe the patent system).
118. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing the non-rival nature of IP
goods).
119. Cf Swygert & Yanes, supra note 112, at 8 (using the term "scarce resource" in a
relevant context, while noting that "there is general agreement among law and economics
proponents that society's combined total well-being can be enhanced by courts, legislatures,
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simultaneously, making the "highest value user" consideration not applica-
ble per se to the IP arena. 20
Moreover, even if an IP asset is in the hands of a party who is not the
"highest value user," the asset can still be simultaneously used by others-
acting under a license from the owner or under a legal doctrine permitting
the relevant use without the owner's consent-to generate utility. Further-
more, as noted by Professor Merges, "[a]ssigning an entitlement to the most
efficient holder is generally not possible in the complex field of intellectual
property, where creative works have many uses requiring multiple transac-
tions." 2 ' At the end of the day, when it comes to intellectual property,
ensuring broad access to the work is much more important than whether the
work is held by a party who may herself extract the highest utility.'122
Access is a key factor in the economic analysis of intellectual proper-
ty.123 From the "access" perspective, taken in isolation, the most efficient
allocation of an IP good is the one where access to the good is ensured to all
users who value it at more than the marginal production cost,124 while any
and administrative agencies knowingly maximizing efficient allocations of scarce resources
120. Cf Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 463 (1999)
(mentioning the "highest valued use" rationale as originating in connection with tangible
property, "where it is usually the case that one use of the good physically precludes anoth-
er"); Matthew Sag, Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology, 103 Nw. U.L. REv. 1607, 1614
(2009) (arguing that "market allocation of scarce resources to their highest valued use is usu-
ally welfare enhancing, but for nonrivalrous goods, the exclusion of low-value users
produces a deadweight loss because their consumption is not at the expense of another who
values the good more"). See generally LANDES & POSNER, supra note 78, at 20 (mentioning
the point that "intellectual property rights create scarcity whereas property rights in physical
goods manage scarcity"). Admittedly, certain uses of an intangible asset may not be perfectly
non-rival. See infra note 1 24. For example, there is generally no economic sense in allocating
a right to create a movie based on a specific novel to more than one party. In such cases, the
need to allocate the right to make such use to the party who values it the most presumably
still holds value. However, when it comes to the entire ownership interest in the underlying
work (e.g., the novel), which the monetary prize offered to the participants in the Studies
purports to represent, the "highest value user" consideration is largely irrelevant, as ex-
plained in the text.
121. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights
and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1293, 1307 (1996).
122. Surely, such a "highest value user" cannot necessarily be expected to provide par-
ticularly broad access to the work. Among other things, she may herself suffer from an
endowment effect once she becomes the owner of the work.
123. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 78, at II (describing the tendency among
economic analysts of intellectual property to focus on the tradeoff between incentives and
access); Gordon, supra note 117, at 619 (noting that one of the standard considerations un-
derlying the study of IP is the need to provide access to members of the public); Robert A.
Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1, 10
(1995) (discussing the central role played by accessibility in copyright theory).
124. This statement is, of course, an oversimplification, as it assumes "perfect" non-rivalry
of IP assets while, in fact, adding users can sometimes impose costs on current users of an IP
good. See generally LANDES & POSNER, supra note 78, at 13 (discussing the potential existence
of congestion externalities in connection with intellectual property). See also supra note 67.
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other result-where the social value of the intellectual property product is
not fully realized-would be considered wasteful.'25 This perspective, how-
ever, does not take into account the need to provide adequate incentives for
private investment in creating intellectual property goods in the first place,'26
which is, in fact, the primary economic justification for IP protection.127
Over the years, various commentators have criticized this justification,
arguing that state intervention is not necessary to secure incentives to invent
and create.128 Despite this criticism, the incentive justification still domi-
nates IP theory and policy. There is naturally a tradeoff between the need to
incentivize innovation and expressive creativity ex ante and the need to en-
sure access to the products resulted from such activities ex post.129
125. Cf Benjamin G. Damstedt, Limiting Locke: A Natural Lw Justification for the
Fair Use Doctrine, 112 YALE L.J. 1179 (2003) (maintaining that a refusal to sell units of an
intangible violates the Lockean "no waste" prohibition); Ofer M. Tur-Sinai, Beyond Incen-
tives: Expanding the Theoretical Framework for Patent Law Analysis, AKRON L. REV.
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1697254 (arguing, in connection with
Locke's labor theory, that "waste seemingly occurs every time a certain potential use of an
intellectual product that could have brought benefit to the user does not materialize").
126. In connection with patent law, scholars have pointed to other incentives, alongside
the basic incentive to invent, that the legal regime of exclusive rights is meant to provide.
One of them is the incentive to disclose the information underlying a new invention. See
generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1028-29 (1989); Gordon, supra note 117, at
632; Julie S. Turner, The Nonmanufacturing Patent Owner: Toward a Theory of Efficient In-
fringement, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 179, 189-90 (1998). Another one is the incentive to invest in
commercialization activities required to turn nascent inventions into new goods and services.
See generally F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inven-
tions, 85 MiNN. L. REv. 697 (2001).
127. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 78, at II (describing the fear that without
legal protection against copying, the incentive to create intellectual property will be under-
mined); Brett Frischmann, Spillovers Theory and Its Conceptual Boundaries, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 801, 803 (2009) (describing the basic economic justification for IP rights as
providing incentives); Tur-Sinai, supra note 68, at 729 (presenting the incentive to invent
theory as the most traditional economic justification for the patent system). The incentive-
based justification for patent law and copyright law has roots in the U.S. Constitution, which
empowers Congress to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Rights to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
128. See generally Tur-Sinai, supra note 68, at 737-39 (summarizing this line of criti-
cism with respect to patent law); Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and
Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513 (2009) (exploring the ways in
which the desire to create can be free from the need for economic incentive); Diane Leenheer
Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12 THEORETICAL IN-
QUIRIES IN LAw 29 (2011) (challenging the traditional incentive justification for copyright
law, while drawing on behavioral studies that suggest that intrinsic factors are much more
important determinants of participation in creative work than such extrinsic ones as monetary
reward).
129. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory
of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1458-59 (2002) (discussing the tradeoff be-
tween ex ante and ex post perspectives underlying patent and copyright law). Trademark
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Broadening the exclusive rights granted to inventors and authors under IP
law increases the incentive to produce IP goods but also limits access to
such goods because it allows IP owners to charge prices in excess of the
marginal cost of production. 3 0 Structuring IP law in a manner that appropri-
ately strikes a balance between the benefits of increased incentives and the
costs of decreased access has been one of the main challenges faced by pol-
icymakers in the IP arena, with various doctrines in IP law designed to
achieve an equilibrium between these competing considerations. 131
Yet the thesis embodied in the Studies, centered on the need to ensure
transfers of the goods to those who value them the most, largely ignores
these fundamental dynamic efficiency considerations.132 As this need is not
a dominant consideration in the context of IP law, the presence of endow-
ment effects provides insufficient justification for legal intervention in the
markets for IP goods, even if it were true that such effects prevent certain
transfers of IP rights to "highest value users."
Intervention, in fact, may work against the policy goals that are central
to IP law, most notably the need to provide incentives to create IP goods. 3 1
Thus, for example, if we were to follow the Writers' recommendations to
protection, by contrast, is not usually thought to embody a comparable tradeoff. See id. at
1459.
130. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 78, at 11, 20-21 (describing the "access
versus incentives" tradeoff); WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH AND WELFARE: A
THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1969) (discussing the basic trade-
off between the desire to provide an incentive to invent and the social loss resulting from the
monopolistic pricing by the patent owner, in an attempt to figure out optimal patent length);
Gaia Bernstein, In the Shadow of Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REv. 2257, 2295 (2010) (not-
ing that patents are traditionally "viewed as a tradeoff between the benefit of encouraging
innovation and the cost of limiting access to the resulting innovation"); Oskar Liivak, Re-
thinking the Concept of Exclusion in Patent Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1643, 1662 (2010) (noting
that the access versus incentives tradeoff is at the heart of most policy discussions about in-
tellectual property); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access
Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 485 (1996) (describing the dominancy of the "examination
of incentives and access" in copyright discourse over the past three centuries).
131. Such doctrines include, for example: (1) the fair use doctrine in copyright law; (2)
compulsory licensing provisions in patent and copyright law; (3) the limited duration of pa-
tents and copyrights; (4) the reverse doctrine of equivalents in patent law; and (5) the
doctrines of patent misuse and copyright misuse.
132. The only instance where the Writers address the potential impact of their pro-
posals on incentives to create is in connection with their suggestion to shift from property
rules to liability rules. See Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing, supra note 4, at 35; infra notes
271-276 and accompanying text (discussing critically the specific argument made by the
Writers in this context); see also Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity, supra note 4, at 45-46
(commenting, in the context of their second study, on the possibility that removing the crea-
tivity effect might have an adverse effect on incentives).
133. Weakening IP rights may not only undermine the economic goals of the IP system,
but may also operate against other values that, according to certain non-utilitarian theories,
the IP system is meant to promote. See generally Tur-Sinai, supra note 125 (discussing the
applicability of the labor theory and the personality theory to patent law); infra notes 244-
246 and accompanying text.
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increase the use of liability rules in IP law and broaden doctrines that allow
for free, non-consented use of IP goods-such as the fair use doctrine in
copyright law-we may end up decreasing the incentive to create IP goods
to a sub-optimal level.13 4 To be sure, the current IP regime does not neces-
sarily achieve an optimal balance among all relevant considerations,' and
there is certainly room for changes in the way that IP law is designed. Yet
effective recommendations for such changes cannot be made without fully
assessing the recommendations' potential negative effect on incentives and
comparing such effect to the proclaimed benefits of the suggested change.'36
B. The Reasons for the Endowment Effect
The Writers' policy recommendations reflect their opinion that the en-
dowment effect'37 recognized in their experiments is a major obstacle to
efficient bargaining that needs to be removed in order to allow IP transac-
tions to occur at a level that is not "significantly suboptimal," i.e., lower than
the level of mutually beneficial transactions that would exist in the absence
of the endowment effect.i1s
In practice, however, the endowment effect does not represent a mere
flaw or impediment to bargaining.'39 The endowment effect does not always
reflect "irrational" behavior 40 and it is not an unambiguous mistake that re-
quires correction.141 In many circumstances, there are legitimate reasons for
the WTA/WTP gap.142 As a result, there is often no obvious answer to the
134. See infra Part V.A. (concerning liability rules), Part V.C. (concerning the fair use
doctrine).
135. Cf Eisenberg, supra note 126, at 1031-32 (noting the difficulty in determining
whether the current level of incentives supplied by the patent system is too high or too low).
136. See Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity, supra note 4, at 44 (acknowledging the
need to base decisions about the desirability of specific proposals on empirical assessments
of the proposals' respective costs and benefits).
137. As noted before, my use of the term "endowment effect" includes the so-called
separate "creativity effect" recognized by Buccafusco & Sprigman, i.e., the enhanced en-
dowment effect expressed by the Painters in their second experimental setting. See supra
note 55.
138. Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity, supra note 4, at 47; Buccafusco & Sprigman,
Valuing, supra note 4, at 4. For the Writers' definition of "suboptimal," see supra note 46.
139. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of Owner-
ship, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1541, 1576 (1998).
140. Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1280. See also Gordon, supra note 58, at 69 (noting
that in many circumstances the endowment effect is both rational and legitimate).
141. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 7, at 219-20 (making such argument, in general,
with respect to departures from expected utility theory, as distinguished from judgment er-
rors).
142. Id. at 220; see also Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1280 (noting that a "preference for
what one has over what one does not have, or for what one is accustomed to compared to the
unknown, is no more troublesome than a preference for chocolate ice cream over vanilla,"
and arguing that "[tihis is true regardless of what causes the endowment effect"); Rachlinksi
& Jourden, supra note 139, at 1576 ("[The] endowment effect is an integral part of how peo-
ple feel about their possessions and rights."). The Writers note as well that "only when we
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question of which claimant values an entitlement the most. 143 In fact, "[b]oth
WTA and WTP constitute real and true measures of people's valuation of
entitlements. Neither measure is invariably superior to the other . . . ."14 In
order to figure out whether WTA or WTP more appropriately measures val-
ue in a particular instance, there is a need to first determine what accounts
for the gap.145 Buccafusco and Sprigman perform such an examination,146
but I disagree with their conclusions, as I explain below.
Over the years, several theories have been offered for why the endow-
ment effect exists. None of these theories can explain the endowment effect
completely, and the precise psychological mechanisms underlying the effect
are not fully understood.147 It is important to note that some scholars have
questioned whether the endowment effect actually exists or whether it is
merely an artifact of the experimental conditions under which it has been
found.148 For example, it has been suggested that the language used in an
experiment might cause subjects to see the endowed good as a gift from the
experimenter or believe that the "correct" choice is to keep the endowed
are confident that the [valuation] asymmetries result from cognitive biases and not just idio-
syncratic preferences should we consider attempts at debiasing." Buccafusco & Sprigman,
Valuing, supra note 4, at 31.
143. Korobkin, supra note 8, at 671. See also Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 5, at 251
(arguing that the endowment effect "may actually cast doubt on the very idea that there exists
some person who values an entitlement most"); Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 139, at
1555 (suggesting that it is not clear whether the socially optimal owner of a commodity is
the person who would pay the most for it or the one who would demand the most to part with
it).
144. Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 5, at 250-51.
145. Korobkin, supra note 8, at 683. See also Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 7, at 220
(noting that in some contexts, a decision maker may determine that either WTA or WTP is
the correct measure of value).
146. See Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity, supra note 4, at 41-43; Buccafusco &
Sprigman, Valuing, supra note 4, at 25-33.
147. See Owen D. Jones & Sarah F. Brosnan, law, Biology, and Property: A New Theo-
ry of the Endowment Effect, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1935, 1936 (2008) (noting that the
endowment effect still puzzles economists and that "there are at present no satisfying expla-
nations for why it manifests when and how it does"); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference
with Private Preferences, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 1129, 1151 (1986) (stating that "[t]he phenom-
enon of endowment effects has complex roots"); see also Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing,
supra note 4, at I1; Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1242; cf Arlen, supra note I1, at 1768 (dis-
cussing behavioral analysis of law, in general, and noting that it "cannot necessarily provide
an alternative framework [to classical economic theory] for developing normative policy pre-
scriptions because it does not yet have a coherent, tractable model of human behavior which
can serve as a basis for such recommendations").
148. Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1242; see also Jones & Brosnan, supra note 147, at
1944-45 (noting the possibility that the effect is a by-product of insufficiently controlled ex-
perimental designs); Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, Exchange Asymmetries Incorrectly
Interpreted as Evidence of Endowment Effect Theory and Prospect Theory?, 97 AM. EcoN.
REV. 1449, 1449 (2007) (arguing that the asymmetries in exchange behavior observed in
previous studies are not a result of loss aversion but are rather an artifact of the experimental
procedures employed).
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good.149 While this may be true, I will assume for the sake of this critique
that the effects recognized in the Studies are indicative of true differences in
subjects' valuations rather than a by-product of the experimental design.
One suggested explanation for the endowment effect is that the gap
between WTA and WTP prices is simply a result of "wealth effects."
"[E]ntitlements are stores of wealth," and the preferences of wealthier
individuals may be slightly different than those of poorer individuals.o50 A
related explanation suggests that WTP prices may be constrained by lack
of resources and thus do not adequately reflect the monetary worth of en-
titlements to relatively poor people.'51 These explanations, however, can
only account for the WTAIWTP gap in a narrow set of circumstances.'52 In
the context of the Writers' experiments, in light of the relatively inexpensive
value of the entitlements at stake, the wealth effect does not seem to be rele-
vant.
Beyond these preliminary explanations, the main theories that have
been suggested to account for the endowment effect are loss aversion and
the ownership/attachment account.'53
Loss Aversion
The endowment effect has been routinely explained as a manifestation
of loss aversion, an element of Kahneman and Tverski's Prospect Theory,154
according to which "losses are weighted substantially more than objectively
commensurate gains in the evaluation of prospects and trades.""' In other
149. Plott & Zeiler, supra note 148, at 1455. See also Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1247
(mentioning the possibility that the "subjects believe the experimental condition to which
they are assigned signals information about the quality of the entitlement at issue").
150. Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1247; see also Cotter, supra note 53, at 59 (explaining
the role that the diminishing marginal utility of income plays in this context); Sunstein, supra
note 147, at 1151.
151. See Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1247; Korobkin, supra note 8, at 684. Yet, in many
cases, a poor person would also have a lower WTA and not just a lower WTP. See Korobkin,
supra note 5, at 1249.
152. Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1248.
153. There are some other explanations that have been suggested. For example, a recent
article, drawing on evolutionary biology, suggests that the endowment effect is an evolved
behavioral predisposition that may seem irrational under modem conditions but may have
been useful under long-stable ancestral conditions. See Jones & Brosnan, supra note 147, at
1959-60.
154. Daniel Khaneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). Prospect Theory states, in general, that value is a
reference-dependent function that decelerates in the domain of losses more quickly than it
accelerates in the domain of gains. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 7, at 205; Morewedge et
al., supra note I1, at 947; van Dijk & van Knippenberg, supra note 8, at 518.
155. Kahneman et al., supra note 5, at 1326-28. For others pointing at loss aversion as
the primary psychological mechanism underlying the endowment effect, see, e.g., Jones &
Brosnan, supra note 147, at 1950; Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1250; Korobkin, supra note 8,
at 688; Morewedge et al., supra note 11, at 947; Plott & Zeiler, supra note 148, at 1449;
Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 139, at 1556.
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words, people tend to experience losses from a given benchmark more in-
tensely than they experience gains of a similar objective magnitude.156
Assuming that individuals view parting with an endowed good as a loss,'17
individuals typically evaluate a loss as greater than the potential gain associ-
ated with acquiring an identical good, which creates the endowment
effect.' 5 1 It should be emphasized that according to the loss aversion ac-
count, the endowment effect is not a result of the enhanced valuation of the
entitlement one owns, but rather represents the disutility associated with
giving up the entitlement.'59 Under this theory, WTP is considered to be a
more accurate measure of the claimant's value for the entitlement at issue. 60
Recently, a growing list of findings casts doubt on the ability of the loss
aversion account to explain the endowment effect.161 In any event, attrib-
uting the endowment effect to loss aversion only begs the question as to
why loss aversion occurs.162 One potential answer to this question is that
many people simply do not view opportunity costs as equivalent to out-of-
pocket costs despite the fact that economists traditionally view them as
equivalent.163 Of the many other suggested explanations for why people ap-
pear to value losses more than equivalent gains, the most prominent is regret
avoidance.164
156. Liberman et al., supra note 59, at 1136.
157. See Bar-Hillel & Neter, supra note 17, at 26 (explaining that once an item be-
comes part of one's endowment, giving it up is experienced as a loss); James K. Beggan, On
the Social Nature of Nonsocial Perception: The Mere Ownership Effect, 62 J. PERSONALITY
& Soc. PSYCHOL. 229, 235 (1992) (noting that when "people encode a given possession as
part of their current wealth," they then "view selling the possession as a loss").
158. Bar-Hillel & Neter, supra note 17, at 26; see also Liberman et al., supra note 59,
at 1136 (noting that the pleasant experience of receiving a new object cannot compensate for
the more intense negative experience of giving up an object one already has); van Dijk & van
Knippenberg, supra note 6, at 486 (describing loss aversion as a "tendency for the disutility
of losing an object to exceed the utility of gaining the same object").
159. Daniel Kahneman et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo
Bias, 5 J. EcON. PERSP. 193, 197 (1991); Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 5, at 252.
160. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1258 (explaining that under this theory, if the
state does not initially award the entitlement to the claimant, she will never actually incur the
costs of selling that she would bear if she were to give up the entitlement); Korobkin, supra
note 8, at 696 (noting that under this theory, the claimant will be indifferent to the choice be-
tween owning the entitlement and having an amount of cash equal to her WTP as long as she
does not have to engage in the act of selling the entitlement).
161. See, e.g., Morewedge et al., supra note 11, at 950 (presenting experiments show-
ing that loss aversion is not the cause of the endowment effect); Plott & Zeiler, supra note
148, at 1452 (rejecting the claim that loss aversion accounts for observed asymmetries in ex-
change).
162. Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 139, at 1557; see also Jones & Brosnan, supra
note 147, at 1951-52 (arguing that loss aversion is not a satisfying theoretical foundation for
the endowment effect and noting it is like "saying that rain is caused by a rainstorm").
163. Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1250 (noting that this "pure" loss aversion explanation
can account for many of the endowment effect experiments but cannot explain all of them).
164. Other second-order explanations for loss aversion are related to the disutility
caused by selling. In some cases, individuals may resist participating in market transactions,
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Regret avoidance is a factor that may account for loss aversion, in gen-
eral, 165 and the endowment effect, in particular.166 People tend to view the
possibility that, in hindsight, they made a bad decision as a risk that needs to
be minimized.167 As a result, people have a strong tendency to maintain the
status quo.168 Considering that people fail to purchase many entitlements on
a daily basis, fear of regret is likely to be greater with respect to a decision
to take action (i.e., relinquish an entitlement) than with respect to a decision
not to take action (i.e., not purchase an entitlement). 6 9 Thus, selling an ob-
ject has a greater potential to bring about regret than failing to buy the same
object. As a result, fear of regret would logically affect WTA prices more
than WTP prices. The WTA price would be higher than the WTP price, ac-
cording to this theory, because the WTA must include a premium that will
compensate the owner for the potential regret she may feel after giving up
the entitlement.170
An example of a context in which fear of regret likely causes the en-
dowment effect is the case of lottery tickets.' 7' People are often reluctant to
exchange lottery tickets even when offered a small monetary incentive to do
so "not because they bond to the paper on which the ticket is printed, but be-
cause trading a ticket away makes people worry that they have traded away a
either in general or specifically with respect to the entitlement at hand, because they perceive
such participation as illegitimate or not dignified. In such cases, they might demand a price
higher than the inherent value of the entitlement in order to compensate them for the discom-
fort associated with the act of selling. See Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1252-53; Korobkin,
supra note 8, at 693. In other cases, people may prefer to be left alone rather than bargaining
and conducting a transaction. Here, too, compensation may be demanded for the costs im-
posed by the act of selling. See Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1253; Korobkin, supra note 8, at
695-96. On top of these explanations, Korobkin includes attachment in the list of second-
order explanations for the loss aversion phenomenon. See Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1251.
Attachment, though, is generally considered an altogether different explanation for the en-
dowment effect, and I will treat it as such. See infra notes 175-182 and accompanying text.
165. See Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1250.
166. See, e.g., Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 139, at 1557 (noting that regret seems
to play an important role in the endowment effect).
167. The negative utility consequence of regretting making a bad decision is apparently
greater than the positive utility consequence of rejoicing over making a good decision. See
Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1254.
168. Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing, supra note 4, at 12.
169. See Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1254 (emphasizing that the regret avoidance expla-
nation must rely, among other things, on the assumption that the utility consequence of
regretting a bad decision to enter into a transaction must be greater than the utility conse-
quence of regretting a bad decision not to enter into a transaction); Korobkin, supra note 8,
at 696 (noting that "[i]f I exhausted myself with regret every time I missed an opportunity, I
would have very little time to do anything else with my life"); Rachlinski & Jourden, supra
note 139, at 1557 (noting that people apparently regret taking action more than deciding not
to take action).
170. See Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1254; Korobkin, supra note 8, at 696.
171. See supra note 80.
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winning ticket."'72 Failing to win the lottery with an exchanged ticket while
the original ticket wins is experienced as an out-of-pocket loss, whereas fail-
ing to win the lottery with the original ticket represents a foregone gain, and
the former is weighted more heavily than the latter.173 The "regret aversion"
explanation is supported by findings that "endowment effects are more like-
ly to be observed when prospective gains and losses are difficult to
integrate, due to either high uncertainty about future exchange prices or
reduced comparability of consumer goods." 74
The Ownership/AttachmentAccount
The endowment effect may also exist as a result of an entitlement be-
coming more valuable upon ownership rather than as a consequence of
negative emotions associated with the sale. In other words, upon ownership,
special valuable features of the good that enhance its total value may be cre-
ated. 7 1 Such enhanced value may be the result of the owner forming an
emotional attachment to the entitlement." 6 The enhanced value may also re-
sult from sentimental value and familiarity.'77 Similarly, according to the
ownership account of the endowment effect, people are often reluctant to re-
linquish the goods they own because they associate those goods with
themselves and thus ascribe them higher values."" A related explanation is
that the endowment effect is the result of individuals' efforts to reduce
172. Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 139, at 1557; see also Bar-Hillel & Neter, supra
note 17 (showing that the fear of giving up a winning ticket drives participants' reluctance to
trade, and ruling out other potential explanations for such reluctance including over-
estimation of the winning probability of one's own ticket); Mandel, supra note i1, at 738
(pointing out that loss aversion may account for why people are reluctant to exchange lottery
tickets). See generally Michal Maimaran, Reducing the Reluctance to Exchange Gambles
(The Hebrew U. of Jerusalem Ctr. for Study of Rationality, Discussion Paper No. 341, 2003),
available at http://ratio.huji.ac.il/dp/dp341.pdf (presenting experiments reaffirming Bar-
Hillel & Neter's conclusions).
173. Maimaran, supra note 172, at 3; see also Bar-Hillel & Neter, supra note 17, at 25.
"[F]rom the vantage point of a ticket owner, the state of the world in which one's original
ticket wins . . . but the new one does not, represents a "loss," whereas the state of the world
in which the new ticket had one exchanged for it, would have won, but holding onto one's
original ticket results in no win, is merely a foregone gain." Id.
174. Mandel, supra note I1, at 738.
175. See Plott & Zeiler, supra note 148, at 1453.
176. Cotter, supra note 53, at 61 ("One explanation [for the endowment effect] is that
people tend to become psychologically attached to their initial endowments, perhaps because
they come to view these endowments as aspects of their personalities."); see also Korobkin,
supra note 8, at 691 (noting that an entitlement may become more valuable upon ownership
as a result of attachment).
177. See Plott & Zeiler, supra note 148, at 1453.
178. See Morewedge, et al., supra note I1, at 947-50 (describing experiments showing
that ownership, rather than loss aversion, is what causes the endowment effect); see also
Beggan, supra note 157, at 229-30 (noting that ownership creates a psychological associa-
tion between the object and the owner).
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cognitive dissonance by high valuation of what one owns and low valuation
of what one does not own.179
What is common to all of these explanations is that they describe own-
ership as associated with phenomena that transform the features of goods
such that the good to be given up is not the same as the good that was ac-
quired.180 These explanations for the endowment effect are more plausible in
some circumstances than in others.'"' When one or a combination of these
explanations accounts for the endowment effect exhibited by an entitlement
claimant in a particular case, it is generally agreed upon that the appropriate
measure of such claimant's valuation of the entitlement would be her WTA
rather than her WTR182
Analysis of the Buccafusco and Sprigman Findings
What caused the effects observed in the Writers' experiments? In their
first study,'83 the Writers concluded that the results were the effect of both
regret aversion and an "optimism/ownership bias." 84 The conclusion that
optimism bias contributed to the result was based on the subjects' responses
to a follow-up question in which they were asked to estimate their poem's
probability of winning the prize. Subjects in all of the roles in the contest
scenarios over-estimated their chance of winning the prize, with greater
over-estimation by sellers than buyers.'8 5 Yet the values assigned by the
sellers to the poems were even higher than the poems' subjective expected
values (i.e., the predicted probability of winning multiplied by the amount
179. Sunstein, supra note 147, at 1151; see also Beggan, supra note 157, at 234-35
(explaining the endowment effect as a result of the desire to maintain a positive sense of
self).
180. See Plott & Zeiler, supra note 148, at 1453.
181. See Korobkin, supra note 8, at 689 (noting that attachment does not seem to be a
likely explanation for why lottery ticket holders value their tickets more than potential pur-
chasers of tickets); see also Kahneman et al., supra note 5, at 1326 (ruling out attachment as
a potential explanation for the endowment effect evidenced in their experiment, where the
values assigned by individuals to the relevant objects increased as soon as the objects were
given to them, though acknowledging that long-term endowment effects could be explained
by attachment).
182. Korobkin, supra note 8, at 691 (reasoning that when the entitlement would be in
such claimant's possession, it will realize this high value).
183. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text (describing the first study).
184. Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing, supra note 4, at 27. It is not entirely clear what
the Writers mean by "optimism/ownership bias." At first, it seems as if they refer to the own-
ership account described above, as they note people's "tendency to prefer things associated
with themselves, and accordingly, to value those things more highly." Id. at 27. Yet, later on,
they make multiple references to the "overly sanguine estimates people make of their own
chances of success," i.e., to "optimism bias," a demonstrated tendency of people to be overly
optimistic about certain outcomes, which is not typically considered part of or related to the
endowment effect. Id. at 27; see infra Part IV.B.2.
185. Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing, supra note 4, at 27. In the lottery scenario (the
third experiment in the first set), the divergences from objective probabilities were much
lower, although for the Authors, they were still noticeable. Id.
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of the prize), which the Writers explained as the result of regret aversion.'86
Noting that endowment effects that grow out of optimism bias lead to ineffi-
ciency and that regret aversion is also, most likely, a welfare-reducing bias,
the Writers concluded that the endowment effect observed in their study
must be mitigated.'
In their second study,'88 the Writers again found that optimism bias ex-
plained some of the results, based on the same type of data regarding the
subjects' assessments of how likely their works were to win the prize, with
Painters' estimates higher than Owners' and both higher than Buyers'.' 89
Here, again, the Writers found that regret aversion may have affected valua-
tions, but because there was no indication that Painters' regret aversion was
higher, the sole explanation for the "creativity effect"-i.e., the Painters'
enhanced valuations-was their "markedly over-optimistic assessments of
their chances to win."' 90 In connection with the second study, the Writers al-
so examined the potential role of emotional attachment.' 9 ' The Painters were
asked to rate their emotional attachment to their works in a follow-up
question.192 It appeared that such ratings did not correlate to the Painters'
valuations.' 93 Based on the Painters' answers, Buccafusco and Sprigman
concluded that emotional attachment does not play a significant role in crea-
tors' valuations of their work.'9' Concluding that the creativity effect is
driven primarily by over-optimism, the Writers argue that pricing decisions
made by creators cannot be relied upon, and that "debiasing, if it is possible
at a reasonably low cost, is an appropriate task for IP law."' 9 5
I disagree with the Writers' analysis for two main reasons: (1) it under-
estimates the role of attachment in the valuation of IP assets by their
186. Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing, supra note 4, at 28.
187. Id. at 32-33.
188. See supra notes 36-45 (describing the second study).
189. Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity, supra note 4, at 42.
190. Id. at 43.
191. One of the reasons why the Writers examined the possibility that attachment
played a role in the Painters' valuations is that "[a] moral rights theorist might interpret the
valuation asymmetries .. . as evidence of the creator's enhanced connection to the work." Id.
at 41. Note that one does not need to be a "moral rights theorist" in order to acknowledge the
personal bond that creators (and inventors) form with their works. While personality theory
often underlies arguments in support of moral rights, it has much broader implications for
the design of IP law. See generally Tur-Sinai, supra note 125, at 24-33 (discussing the im-
portance of the personality theory in connection with patent law).
192. The question read, "How would you rate your level of personal and emotional in-
vestment or attachment to the painting?" The participant was asked to answer by choosing
from a scale from one ("Not at all") to ten ("Very Much"). Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativ-
ity, supra note 4, at 38 n.27.
193. Id. at 41 ("Painters who felt strongly attached to their works were no more likely
to assign high values to them than were those who felt less attached to their works.").
194. Id.
195. Id. at 43.
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creators; and (2) it relies on the erroneous assumption that over-optimism
necessarily leads to inefficiency.
1. The Role of Attachment in the Valuation of IP Assets
Buccafusco and Sprigman based their conclusion that emotional at-
tachment was not a relevant factor in creators' valuations on a single
follow-up question posed to twenty Painters participating in the second
experiment. 9 6 This hardly constitutes sufficient data to support the Writers'
inference that attachment is not a factor contributing to the high values as-
cribed by creators of IP goods-an inference that leads directly to their
policy recommendations.' 97 Moreover, the narrowly drafted question,
whereby the Painters were asked to rate their "level of personal and emo-
tional investment or attachment to the painting,"'98 failed to capture the
various potential value-enhancing features that may be created as a result of
ownership of a good.199 It should also be noted that it is not the case that the
Painters expressed no attachment to their works in response to this question,
but rather that there was no correlation between the degrees of attachment
expressed and the values ascribed to the works.20 The lack of such correla-
tion does not mean that attachment was not among the factors contributing
to the Painters' higher valuation of the works compared to other subjects
whose emotional connection to the works was presumably lower.201 For ex-
ample, the lack of correlation may be the result of Painters' different ways
of quantifying their emotional attachment or the result of other factors that
ultimately combined with attachment in forming individual valuations.
In any event, even if emotional attachment did not drive the Painters'
high valuations in the second experiment, the experiment does not effective-
ly represent the reality of IP transactions. The entitlement changing hands in
the experiment was the chance to win a financial prize.202 The valuation thus
referred to that chance rather than to the underlying work. While a creator's
196. The effect of creators' emotional attachment on valuation may be examined
through an experiment (rather than a follow-up question). For an experiment that could be
used for this purpose, see supra note 55.
197. See, e.g., Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity, supra note 4, at 43 (noting that
"[w]hile there might be good reasons to credit creators' valuations if they are the result of
regret aversion or enhanced feelings of emotional attachment, we can see no valid reason for
respecting pricing decisions that are driven almost exclusively by irrational biases").
198. See supra note 192.
199. See supra notes 175-179 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 193. No further information about the data was provided in the
Studies. For example, it is not clear whether the differences in the levels of attachment speci-
fied by the subjects were significant or relatively minor.
201. Buccafusco & Sprigman themselves acknowledge the possibility that even though
relatively more attachment did not result in higher values within the class of Painters, overall
differences in emotional attachment between Painters and Owners or Buyers may have af-
fected valuation. See Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity, supra note 4, at 41 n.38.
202. See supra text accompanying note 72.
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attachment to her work may have some impact on her valuation of the right
to participate in a contest,203 it makes sense that such effect would not be
particularly strong.204 In contrast to the experiment, however, when an IP
owner grants a license to use her work, her emotional attachment to the
work is likely to have a strong effect on her pricing decisions.205
The personal bond between creators and their works is known to be par-
ticularly strong in comparison to the general level of attachment that owners
may develop towards their goods.206 Such strong bonds result, among other
things, from the fact that the personality of a creator is often embedded in
her work. 207 This is precisely why the personality theory-which justifies
private property based on its role in enabling a person to develop her
personality-has been commonly used in connection with intellectual prop-
erty in general and copyright law in particular.208 It should be emphasized
203. For instance, a creator who has emotional attachment to her work may value being
the one who actually receives the prize should her work win, and this may cause her to as-
cribe a higher value to the chance of winning the prize. Indeed, from the creator's
perspective, winning the contest may be worth not only the monetary prize of one hundred
dollars but also the value of the prestige associated with receiving the prize.
204. The similarity between the chance to win the prize and a lottery ticket has already
been noted. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. As explained above, attachment
does not seem to be a likely explanation for why lottery ticket holders value their tickets
more than potential purchasers of tickets. See supra note 181.
205. Cf Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1252 (viewing the attachment account as a promis-
ing explanation for the particularly strong endowment effect demonstrated in connection
with earned goods, as it might be easier to create a sentimental bond with an entitlement that
was not acquired randomly than with one that was).
206. See, e.g., Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 609, 610 (1993); Brian M. Hoffstadt, Dispossession, Intellectual Property, and
the Sin of Theoretical Homogeneity, 80 S. CAL. L. REv. 909, 935 (2007); Justin Hughes, The
Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEo. L.J. 287, 330, 365 (1988); Stephen M. McJohn,
The Paradoxes of Free Software, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 25, 45 (2000); David W. Opderbeck,
Symposium: Closing In on Open Science: Trends in Intellectual Property & Scientific Re-
search: A Virtue-Centered Approach to the Biotechnology Commons (or the Virtuous
Penguin), 59 ME. L. REV. 315, 319 (2007).
207. See Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual
Property, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81, 82 (1998) (discussing various personality aspects
that may come into play during the process of creating an intellectual product). The identifica-
tion with an intellectual product may also be particularly strong in comparison with the
identification with other types of assets in light of the inherent uniqueness of such product.
208. The personality theory was originally formulated by Hegel. See G.W.F. HEGEL,
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (S.W. Dyde trans., 1996) (1821). The theory was-more recently re-
fined by Professor Radin. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 957 (1982). In fact, the approach described in the text, in which a personhood interest
can result from the personality of the creator being embedded in her work, deviates from Ra-
din's version of the personality theory, which focuses on the attachment created between an
object and its holder while attributing no significance to the development process of the ob-
ject, and is certainly remote from Hegel's original theory. See Tur-Sinai, supra note 125, at
26. Interestingly, though, such an approach has early roots in the writings of Kant and Fichte,
who viewed literary works specifically as external expressions of their authors' personalities.
See generally PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 80-81 (1995);
DAVID SAUNDERS, AUTHORSHIP AND COPYRIGHT 106-15 (1992).
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that such an emotional bond, resulting largely from the extent to which an
intellectual product reflects the personality of its creator, may exist not only
with respect to creative works of authorship, the subject matter of copyright
protection, but also with respect to inventions that are the subject matter of
patent protection.209 An invention is often a unique intellectual product
where the inventor's education, intellectual skills, professional experience,
vision, and imagination all come into play.210 Creators' and inventors'
emotional connection with their intellectual products may be enhanced
even further during the ongoing process of commercialization. 2 11 While
commercializing her product, the inventor or author often reveals herself
to other individuals who learn to recognize her first and foremost as the
creator of such work. The creator becomes identified with the work212 and
the work becomes part of her public persona. 213 This may ultimately in-
crease the creator's valuation of the work even further.
The emotional connection that a creator develops towards her work may
undoubtedly affect not only her valuation of the work, but also her decisions
regarding the prices to be charged for various uses of the work. When a per-
son cares about something personally, she is also likely to feel more
personally about the prices charged for using it. For instance, an artist who
feels attachment to her painting may also hold a sense of entitlement and
pride with respect to such painting,214 and consequently may be hurt if the
piece sells for what she considers to be too low of a price.215 Moreover, due
209. For a detailed presentation of this argument, see Tur-Sinai, supra note 125, at 26-27.
210. Cf Steven Cherensky, A Penny for Their Thoughts: Employee-Inventors, Preinven-
tion Assignment Agreements, Property, and Personhood, 81 CAL. L. REv. 595, 598 (1993)
(noting that the employee's interest in an intellectual product she developed may be based on
investment of personal capital, i.e., "training and education, personality, individual genius,
extraordinary effort, creative spark, and even divine revelation").
211. Such ongoing commercialization is possible thanks to the non-rival nature of intel-
lectual products. The owner of an IP good can commercialize it (i.e., sell physical
embodiments of it and/or grant licenses to use it) without hurting her ability to continue to
do so in the future.
212. See Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The
Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REv. 75, 90 n.61 (1994) (discussing the tendency of
inventors to strongly identify with their inventions); cf Russell W. Belk, Possessions and the
Extended Self, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 139, 144, 150 (1988) (presenting multidisciplinary evi-
dence supporting the premise that our possessions in general are a major contributor to and
reflection of our identities, and listing creation as one of the means by which things become
a part of the self).
213. Cf Hughes, supra note 206, at 343.
214. See generally Lowenstein & Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 158 (noting that cogni-
tive theories of emotions mention pride as one of the emotions that one can experience as a
result of a positive outcome, specifically when the outcome is due to one's own efforts).
215. See Sunstein, supra note 147, at 1151; see also supra text accompanying note 179
(arguing that the endowment effect reflects an effort to reduce cognitive dissonance by the high
valuation of what one owns). This argument seems to be even stronger in the context of valuing
what one has created. The creator may also be concerned that selling for a low price indicates
her low confidence in her work, which may end up detrimentally affecting her career.
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to the special personal connection between a creator and her work, pricing,
as well as the initial decision whether to license at all, may also be affected
by the specific purpose for which a license is requested. A creator may as-
cribe lower prices to specific uses of the work that she favors, due to artistic
considerations or other reasons, than to uses that she disfavors.
To the extent the endowment effect in IP transactions results from the per-
sonal connection between creators and their works, it is fully consistent with
the rational choice model.2 16 Therefore, even under the "highest value user"
principle,217 no intervention is necessary, as the WTA price in such case is a
rational and legitimate measure of value rather than a mistake that needs cor-
rection.2 18 In other words, there is no justification for debiasing a creator who
factors her attachment to her work or other comparable emotions into her pric-
ing decisions. 219 Even if such behavior ultimately results in fewer transactions,
it does not mean that such number is suboptimal or that such result is ineffi-
cient. Attachment of creators to their works should be respected by the legal
system. A regime that does not respect creators' attachment is not only likely
to act against the personality interests of creators, 220 but also may result in
great inefficiency by diminishing the incentive to create new IP goods.
2. Over-Optimism Does Not Necessarily Lead to Inefficiency
The Writers conclude that the creativity effect detected in their Studies
was driven mostly by over-optimism, and hence debiasing is warranted. 221
Even assuming that over-optimism played a significant role in the subjects'
216. The rational choice model is the conventional assumption of law and economics
pursuant to which people exhibit rational choice, i.e., they are "self-interested utility maxi-
mizers with stable preferences and the capacity to optimally accumulate and assess
information." Arlen, supra note I1, at 1766.
217. See supra Part IV.A.
218. See supra note 182 and accompanying text; see also supra note 197.
219. As stated above, when attachment is the reason for the endowment effect, it is
generally agreed upon that the WTA price is the right measure. See supra note 182 and ac-
companying text; see also Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity, supra note 4, at 41 (noting
that when the endowment effect is a result of the creator's enhanced connection to the work,
a "moral rights theorist" would assert that the law should make no attempt at debiasing au-
thors). As noted above, the argument made herein has nothing to do with moral rights. See
supra note 191. While it is true that various scholars have used the existence of a strong con-
nection between authors and their works in support of arguments calling for strengthening
authors' moral rights, the point made herein is different. As explained above, my argument is
that inasmuch as the personal connection of creators to their work affects their pricing deci-
sions, such decisions need to be respected. See generally Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note
139, at 1576 (noting that inasmuch as the law reflects people's attachment to certain posses-
sions, it would be inappropriate to try to undermine this attachment by changing the law).
220. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing personality theory).
221. See supra text accompanying notes 190, 195.
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valuations,222 and accepting that over-optimism may play a significant role in
reality as well,223 legal intervention is not justified.
Over-optimism is considered to be a common trait. 224 It is usually dis-
cussed in connection with people's tendency to overlook potential bad
outcomes, 225 but it can also account for the tendency to overestimate the
likelihood of good outcomes. 226 While in many contexts over-optimism may
be problematic (for example, by leading individuals to employ sub-optimal
cautionary measures 227), it can also be beneficial. For example, in a business
setting, over-optimism "seems directly related to good mental health and is
consistent with high company morale."228
In the context of creating IP goods, optimism on behalf of authors or
inventors is often positive and may play an important role in establishing the
necessary level of incentives to motivate creation or invention. 29 Authors
and inventors often take on large risks, as they must invest time, money,
mental and physical exertions, and other resources in the process of creating
a new work or developing a new invention while facing high levels of un-
certainty. 230 Even after the creation process is completed, authors and
inventors may need to invest further resources to commercialize their works
222. Here, again, the conclusion relied on a single follow-up question in which the sub-
jects were asked to predict their probability of winning the prize. As this question was
asked after the subjects had already specified their WTA prices, it is possible that there
was an element of self-justification in their answer ("if I demand so much, I must estimate
my chances to win highly"), even if the real reasons driving the high valuation may have
been different.
223. As explained above, there may in fact be other considerations, such as emotional
attachment, that surely have a significant effect on valuation as well.
224. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Con-
tract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 225 (1995) (noting that individuals are "systematically disposed
toward undue optimism"); Benjamin Means, A Contractual Approach to Shareholder Op-
pression Law, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1161, 1175 (2010) (noting the human tendency to
overvalue the likely success of projects and to underestimate risks); Rachlinski, supra note
53, at 1172 (mentioning over-optimism in connection with the "family" of self-serving bias-
es); Cass R. Sunstein, Review: Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 772 (2003)
(noting that "[w]ith respect to most of the risks of life, people appear to be unrealistically
optimistic"); Sean Hannon Williams, Sticky Expectations: Responses to Persistent Over-
Optimism in Marriage, Employment Contracts, and Credit Card Use, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 733, 742-45 (2009) (providing numerous examples of common manifestations of opti-
mism bias).
225. See, e.g., Arlen, supra note I1, at 1773 (noting that empirical evidence "suggest[s]
that people make consistent and systematic errors in risk assessment").
226. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 58, at 71 (referring to Adam Smith's statement that
many people are overly optimistic about their chances for success); Jolls & Sunstein, supra
note 7, at 204-05.
227. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 7, at 205-06 (discussing possible ways to debias
over-optimism).
228. Rachlinski, supra note 53, at 1211.
229. Cf Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity, supra note 4, at 45-46 ("In many cases,
the willingness to engage in creative tasks may itself be a function of individuals' excessive
optimism about the likelihood of success.").
230. See, e.g., Tur-Sinai, supra note 68, at 735-36.
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in a competitive environment where success is not guaranteed.23' Not all au-
thors and inventors make a profit that even covers their costs. Thus, in order
to encourage the development of creative goods, a certain degree of excess
optimism on behalf of artists and inventors should be accepted.232 In fact, if
artists and inventors were not optimistic about their ability to make money,
some innovative and creative endeavors would never be realized.2 3
Moreover, while the Studies could accurately identify excessive opti-
mism as clearly irrational behavior,234 reality is different. A creator's refusal
to license her work because she believes she deserves more money than
what is currently offered is not necessarily irrational. In fact, a creator who
insists on a higher price for using her work may actually obtain more mon-
ey, either from the specific licensee she is currently negotiating with235 or
from other prospective licensees seeking to make a similar use. Even if the
creator has misjudged the market and fails to sell the rights to her work, her
over-optimism may correct itself without the need for intrusive external in-
terventions in the form of liability rules or broadened fair use privileges. As
noted above, creators of IP goods generally have high motivation to license
such goods. 236 Thus, creators who initially demand non-realistic fees for the
use of their work will likely reevaluate their chances and readjust their prices
after receiving feedback from the market.237 An initial high price demanded by
231. See generally Kieff, supra note 126, at 707-08 (listing the numerous activities that
must take place after an invention is made but before it can be profitably exploited).
232. Cf Dennis D. Crouch, The Patent Lottery: Exploiting Behavioral Economics for
the Common Good, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 141, 172 (2008) (proposing to harness over-
optimism of entrepreneurs and investors to produce positive effects in social policy).
233. Interestingly, for many innovators, the ability to earn an occasional windfall is an
important factor in the ex ante decision to embark on a specific creative endeavor. See, e.g.,
F. M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 3, 20 (Rochelle Dreyfuss et
al. eds., 2001) (arguing that there are investors who attribute great importance to the poten-
tial to earn particularly big rewards, even if such possibility is rare); Justin Hughes,
Copyright and Its Rewards, Foreseen and Unforeseen, 122 HARv. L. REV. F. 81, 82 (2009)
(noting that many sectors of intellectual property are "gamble economies" in which invest-
ments are made in portfolios with the expectation that "occasional blockbuster successes"
would occur); see also Crouch, supra note 232, at 142 (arguing that policies that marginally
increase the potential size of the patent reward may have more impact on innovative activity
than those that marginally increase the probability of obtaining value from a patent).
234. See Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing, supra note 4, at 32 (explaining that
"[r]efusing to sell a lottery ticket for anything less than $20 because you inaccurately believe
it has a higher chance to win is inefficient").
235. See Rachlinski, supra note 53, at 1223 ("[N]egotiators who believe that they are
entitled to more than a fair share actually obtain more in negotiations.").
236. See supra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
237. See generally Arlen, supra note I1, at 1782 ("People operating in certain markets
where learning is possible and errors are punished . . . may not be overly optimistic."). Ad-
mittedly, due to the inherent uniqueness of each new IP product, the corrective role played
by market learning in IP transactions may be somewhat smaller; but it would still be signifi-
cant, especially in the context of the ongoing commercialization process of a particular work.
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a seller is often merely a strategic starting point for negotiation. 238 Therefore,
there is no need to be overly concerned about creators' over-optimism.
Over-optimism can also characterize buyers' behavior,23 9 which may
mitigate the endowment effect. For example, a potential licensee of an IP
good may be willing to pay an "irrationally" high amount of money for a
license due to her own over-optimism with respect to the project in which
she intends to use such IP good.
All in all, the data gathered in the Studies is not sufficient to make a
clear case for debiasing. Even to the extent the effects recognized in the
Studies might reflect reality, such effects do not necessarily constitute mis-
takes that need to be corrected. There are many possible reasons for the
difference between WTA and WTP, and the applicable reasons may change
from one case to another. In the context of IP transactions, emotional
attachment and other similar factors may serve a significant role in valua-
tions. Creators' attachment to their works should be respected, not
corrected, by the legal system. Over-optimism on behalf of creators, too,
does not necessarily lead to inefficient results, and may be even helpful in
counter-balancing the financial risks associated with creative activity. All
things considered, there is simply no justification for the Writers' pre-
scription to fix what is not broken and weaken intellectual property rights.
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS: THE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS
Even if it were true that the Writers' experiments indicate a strong
endowment effect that is indicative of reality and justifies intervention, the
specific intervening proposals suggested in the Studies are problematic.
Prior to delving into the specific shortfalls of each recommendation, a few
general points should be noted.
First, in seeking to neutralize the perceived outcomes of the endowment
effect, the Writers do not give sufficient consideration to the potential nega-
tive implications of their suggested changes to the various goals of our IP
238. See supra text accompanying note 108 (discussing the ability to bargain in the ac-
tual markets). Allegedly, the fact that bargaining was not an option for the participants in the
Studies may indicate that the prices they demanded were final prices that could not be low-
ered. In reality, however, if there were no takers in such "final" price, an owner with high
transaction demand could nevertheless agree to settle for a lower price. Beyond that, subjects
may be so programmed to respond strategically to inquiries regarding their pricing deci-
sions-i.e., sellers tend to begin negotiations with high demands while buyers tend to begin
with low offers-that the values elicited in experimental settings may still be biased by such
habits, even when no bargaining is allowed. See generally Kahneman et al., supra note 5, at
1326 (noting that in reality, "[slellers are often rewarded for overstating their true value, and
buyers for understating theirs," and therefore, "[b]y force of habit they may misrepresent
their true valuations even when such misrepresentation confers no advantage"); Korobkin,
supra note 5, at 1243 (describing this "strategic heuristic").
239. In Buccafusco & Sprigman's experiments, the buyers showed over-optimism in
their predictions of their chances to win, though to a lesser degree than the sellers. See supra
note 185 and accompanying text.
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system. 240 Under economic theory, IP laws are designed first and foremost
to incentivize the creation of new IP goods.24 1 The Writers' suggestions,
e.g., the proposed expansion of the doctrine of fair use in copyright law and
similar doctrines, 242 may have a detrimental effect on such incentives. 243
Alongside the economic goals of IP laws, there are other theoretical founda-
tions for IP rights, such as the labor and personality theories.2 " The Writers
similarly ignore in large part such alternative theories and their respective
values,245 such as the need to provide just reward for labor and the need to
enable individuals to develop their personalities. The proposals made in the
Studies could potentially undermine such values. For example, a general
shift towards liability rules in IP law may run against the labor theory's
basic argument that laborers should be awarded property rights in the fruits
of their labor.246 Hence, even if the changes recommended by the Writers
were effective in removing obstacles for transacting in IP markets, such
changes would be undesirable from other perspectives.
Second, the Writers' recommendations are overbroad and not sufficient-
ly tailored to address the narrow problem discussed in the Studies. For
example, the suggestion to vest initial ownership of IP rights more often in
240. But see Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity, supra note 4, at 44 (implying a need
for further research to assess the respective costs and benefits of the suggested solutions).
241. See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text.
242. See discussion infra Part V.C.
243. Admittedly, however, expanding such doctrines may increase the freedom to en-
gage in the creation of second-generation works. All in all, it is hard to evaluate the
cumulative effect.
244. Labor theory, based on the work of John Locke, posits that every person has a
right to the fruits of her labor. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 290-91
(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). Personality theory, as explained
above, focuses on private property as a means to enable individuals to develop and realize
their personalities. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. See generally Tur-Sinai, Be-
yond Incentives, supra note 125 (promoting a broader use of labor and personality theories
as part of the framework for patent law analysis).
245. The Writers briefly acknowledge the existence of "noneconomic justifications for
IP rights" but stick to the framework of economic analysis. See Buccafusco & Sprigman,
Valuing, supra note 4, at 3 n.10. Interestingly, one follow-up question for the Painters in the
second experimental set required them to specify the number of hours they had spent on the
work. When analyzing the results, the Writers note that the number of hours spent by each
Painter did not correlate with the Painter's valuation. Based on this data, the Writers con-
clude that labor plays an insignificant role in creators' valuation of their work. See
Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity, supra note 4, at 41. It is doubtful whether the data sup-
ports such conclusion. Cf. supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text (criticizing the
comparable inference of the Writers with respect to the effect of emotional attachment on the
Painters' valuations).
246. As another example, the expansion of the fair use doctrine, which essentially al-
lows free use of a copyrighted work without even trying to get the creator's prior consent,
may arguably diminish the creator's ability to uniquely identify herself with her work and
enjoy adequate recognition from others, as may be required in order for her to fully develop
her personality. Such a potential effect of the suggested reform needs to be evaluated and
taken into account.
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the hands of intermediaries such as an employer or another person who is
not the individual creator herself2 4 7 is likely to have a broad effect which
exceeds the narrow goal of the Writers to address the endowment effect.
The person who owns an IP right gains control over many decisions in
contexts where the endowment effect plays no role. The owner of a copy-
right, for example, has control over all decisions about whether to create,
or license others to create, derivative works based on the copyrighted
work.2 48 Similarly, a shift from property rule protection to liability rule
protection, if not explicitly limited to narrowly-crafted contexts,249 may
have a far wider effect than what is necessary to address the endowment
effect "problem" pointed out by the Writers. For example, the analysis
conducted in the Studies does not provide justification for depriving a pa-
tent or copyright owner of property rule protection vis-a-vis a mere
imitator.250
Third, the Writers' use of the word "debiasing" to describe their sug-
gestions 251 is a misnomer. As explained above, debiasing is the action of
steering people in more rational directions by operating directly on their
behavior.252 It is only one of the possible approaches to address deviations
from the rational choice model, also known as "bounded rationality."25 3
An alternative approach is to insulate outcomes from the effects of
bounded rationality without trying to affect it. This is known as an "insu-
lating technique."2 54 Debiasing generally represents a less intrusive, more
direct, and more democratic response to the problem of bounded rationali-
ty.255 It aims to correct errors while still preserving as much opportunity as
possible for people to make their own choices. 256 It also reduces the ef-
fects of the legal intervention on those not suffering from bounded
rationality in the first place.257
247. See infra Part V.D.
248. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2007).
249. See infra note 265 (listing examples of such narrow liability rules suggested by
scholars in various contexts).
250. See also infra text following note 297 (making a similar argument related to the
suggestion to insert formalities into copyright law).
251. See, e.g., Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity, supra note 4, at 41, 46; Buccafusco
& Sprigman, Valuing, supra note 4, at 30, 31.
252. See supra note 7.
253. For the rational choice model, see supra note 216.
254. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 7, at 199. A third alternative is not to respond at all.
See id. at 225-36 (noting that a governmental response is likely to be unwarranted, for in-
stance, when people are able to correct their own errors); supra text accompanying notes
234-238 (implicitly embracing such an approach in relation to the perceived over-optimism
of creators while explaining that such over-optimism may correct itself without the need for
intervention).
255. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 7, at 200-01.
256. Id. at 202.
257. Id. at 202, 226.
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However, using "debiasing" in the context of the measures suggested
in the Studies is inaccurate. Expanding the fair use exception in copyright
law, for instance, is better characterized as a direct insulating technique. 258
The suggested shift to liability rules is another insulating solution because
the Writers propose employing them to ensure that certain transfers occur
not by affecting owners' preferences but by forcing such transfers upon
owners. 259
A. Liability Rules
The first solution the Writers consider is to increase the use of liabil-
ity rules in IP law in lieu of property rules. An entitlement is protected by
a property rule if no one can appropriate it without the consent of the
owner at a price she determines. 260 A liability rule, on the other hand, al-
lows for the transfer of the entitlement without the consent of its owner as
long as the owner receives adequate compensation as determined by the
courts or by another organ of the state."1 The Writers question IP law's
preference for property rules, arguing that combined with the existence of
endowment effects, property rules might impose substantial bargaining
costs arising from the need to bridge the large differences in valuations
between the parties. 262 The Writers therefore suggest that policymakers
"consider shifting IP law's mix of entitlements toward liability rules."263
The existence of transaction costs in the markets for IP rights is well
documented and has been considered by scholars investigating the choice
between property rules and liability rules in the IP context.264 The prevalent
258. While in some cases the fair use exception may also have an indirect effect on ne-
gotiations between parties uncertain of the applicability of the fair use defense to their case,
its main effect is to permit uses that would otherwise be blocked because of the owner's so-
called bounded rationality.
259. See infra notes 277-280 and accompanying text.
260. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and In-
alienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1092, 1105 (1972).
261. Id. at 1092, 1106-10.
262. Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity, supra note 4, at 51-52; Buccafusco & Sprig-
man, Valuing, supra note 4, at 33-35.
263. Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity, supra note 4, at 32.
264. See Eisenberg, supra note 126, at 1073; Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisen-
berg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280
SCIENCE 698, 701 (1998); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual
Property Law, 75 TEx. L. REV. 989, 1053-65 (1997); Merges, supra note 212, at 89-91, 99-
100; Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLuM. L. REV. 839, 874-75 (1990); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use
in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1179 (2000); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific
Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 77
(1999) [hereinafter Rai, Regulating]; Arti Kaur Rai, Evolving Scientific Norms and Intellec-
tual Property Rights: A Reply to Kieff, 95 Nw. U.L. REV. 707 (2001); see also supra note 53
(listing scholarly publications dealing with the endowment effect itself in connection with IP
law).
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view, however, is that other than in specific and relatively narrow con-
texts, 2 65  property rules should generally be used to protect IP
rights. 2 66 In many situations involving intellectual property rights, proper-
ty rules entitlements drive industry participants to invest in institutions
that lower the costs of exchange in the presence of high transactions
costs. 2 67 These institutions include copyright collecting societies, such as
the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers
("ASCAP"), 2 68 and patent pools that facilitate market transactions and
ease access to patented technologies. 269 Property rules, accordingly, have
been proven to work effectively. 270
Moreover, liability rules have significant disadvantages that the Stud-
ies do not fully take into account. 271 Most importantly, liability rules may
265. See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging
Rights in Subpatentable Innovation, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 23, 39-48 (Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001) (proposing a liability rule regime with respect to cumulative sub-
patentable developments); Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the
Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76
WASH. L. REV. 1, 9-10, 54-55 (2001) (suggesting, with respect to biomedical research tools,
employing a liability rule regime in the development stage of follow-on products); Katherine
J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get?: Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004
Wis. L. REV. 81, 142-46 (2004) (supporting a compulsory licenses regime with respect to
research tools that would be triggered a few years after the registration of the patent); Tur-
Sinai, supra note 68, at 760-66 (advocating the use of liability rules in the specific context of
cumulative innovation in patent law).
266. See, e.g., Kieff, supra note 126, at 732 (arguing that "only property rules are ap-
propriate for patents"); Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual
Property, 94 COLuM. L. REV. 2655, 2664-67 (1994) (discussing the justifications for a prop-
erty rule regime in connection with IP rights).
267. Merges, supra note 266, at 2655; see also Merges, supra note 121, at 1293 (argu-
ing that repeat players can and often do take steps to overcome transaction bottlenecks).
268. ASCAP is "the private copyright organization that collects composers' perfor-
mance rights for licensing to radio stations and nightclubs." Merges, supra note 266, at 2662
n. 26.
269. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 264, at 700; see also Robert P. Merges, Institu-
tions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of Patent Pools, in EXPANDING THE
BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCI-
ETY 123 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al., eds., 2001); John H. Barton, Patents and
Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent Breadth and Sequential Innovation, 65 ANTITRUST
449, 462-65 (1996); Rai, Regulating, supra note 264, at 129-33.
270. Liability rules, in contrast, are expected to work against such flexible voluntary
institutions by removing to a large extent the parties' motivation to engage in their creation.
See Merges, supra note 266, at 2662, 2669 (citing PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCI-
PLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE § 11.0 (1989)) (noting that compulsory licenses may prevent the
creation of organizations that would efficiently administer the rights-clearance process). See
also id. at 2670-72 (arguing that another primary reason to favor voluntary institutions is the
difficulty of dislodging compulsory licenses even in the face of radically changed circum-
stances).
271. But see Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity, supra note 4, at 51-52 (generally not-
ing the need to consider the respective costs and benefits of liability rules and property rules
when selecting the appropriate standard for IP law).
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diminish the incentive to develop creative goods. There is an inherent risk
of incorrect valuations associated with the application of liability rules, 272
increased in the context of intellectual property, due to the essential
uniqueness of most IP goods. 27 3 The Writers address the possibility of
valuation errors, but do not view such errors as problematic because they
assume a symmetrical distribution of such errors. 274 This assumption,
however, is not based on any empirical data, and it may be the case that
courts often err and set damages too low. 275 Furthermore, even if creators
and inventors know in advance that they are entitled to fair compensation
for non-consented uses of their works, they are unlikely to value such
compensation as highly as they would value the ability to simply control
decisions related to the commercialization of their works. 276
Surely, bargaining toward a voluntary agreement between the parties
can still occur under liability rules. 277 However, the parties may not
272. In general, a voluntary agreement between parties is considered more efficient
than a solution dictated by an external decision maker under a liability rule because such an
agreement most precisely corresponds to the needs of the parties who have better infor-
mation about the relevant parameters. See Arlen, supra note I1, at 1769 ("Proposals designed
to address biases generally entail the intervention of judges, legislators, or bureaucrats who
are also subject to various biases."); Jolts & Sunstein, supra note 7, at 233 (noting that poli-
cymakers and administrators will often suffer from bounded rationality themselves); James
E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another
Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 440, 453 (1995) (pointing out that problems in obtaining and pro-
cessing information might impede efficient decision making by the judge in liability rule
cases).
273. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 266, at 2664 ("Because each asset covered by an [in-
tellectual property right] is in some sense unique . . . [i]t is difficult for a court in an
infringement case to properly value the right-holder's loss. Hence, the parties should be left
to make their own deal.").
274. Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity, supra note 4, at 51; Buccafusco & Sprigman,
Valuing, supra note 4, at 35 (noting that symmetrical mispricing may not create substantial
ex ante disincentives to create).
275. See Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1283 (noting that "courts might err and set damag-
es that are too low" and explaining that such undercompensation would encourage inefficient
entitlement transfers); see also Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 5, at 249-50 (discussing the
risk of systematic undercompensation that might result from a gap between the compensa-
tion rule used by the courts (objective market value) and owners' higher subjective valuation
of the entitlement, which may be intensified due to the enhanced endowment effect that can
be expected under liability rules); Merges, supra note 121, at 1304 (expressing a concern
that "because of the idiosyncratic value of [intellectual property rights], a liability rule will
sometimes be set too low").
276. See, e.g., Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 5, at 247 (arguing that "liability rules lead
to greater intervention in individuals' free will and autonomy than is necessary"); see also
Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing, supra note 4, at 28-29 (pointing out that a surprisingly
large number of Authors and Owners in the first experimental set reported a WTA price equal
to the amount of the prize, indicating that they refused to sell their chance to win the prize
and suggesting that this may "point to the high regard that some people have for property
rules that protect their right to reject transfers").
277. See generally Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal
Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1059-60 (1995) (arguing that
161Fall 2011]
162 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
always be motivated to engage in bargaining. Furthermore, scholars have
argued that such bargaining efforts, even when they take place, are much
more prone to failure than bargaining under property rules.278 Among oth-
er problems, liability rules may discourage potential users of IP from
offering owners a fair division of the profits in the pre-taking bargaining
phase.279 The Writers do not provide a convincing argument for why, in the
context of the Studies, this would not occur, and they seem to accept the
non-market pricing entailed by liability rules as a reasonable solution. In es-
sence, then, the role attributed to liability rules by the Writers is an
"insulating" rather than a "debiasing" role. 280
As part of their discussion, the Writers rely on a previous study con-
ducted by Rachlinski and Jourden2 8 1 that specifically examines the impact of
the choice between property rules and liability rules on the endowment ef-
fect. In Rachlinski and Jourden's experiment, a stronger endowment effect
was manifested when the entitlement was protected by a property rule than
when it was protected by a liability rule.28 2 Other scholars have noted the
dearth of data and definitive need for further empirical work in such con-
text, 283 and Rachlinski and Jourden's conclusion that the endowment effect
is heightened under property rules has been criticized as unsubstantiated. 284
Professor Lewinsohn-Zamir, in particular, takes the opposite position and
argues that the endowment effect is likely to be less pronounced under a
bargaining in the shadow of liability rules may actually be superior because such rules in-
duce owners to reveal their true valuation of the entitlement).
278. See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 5, at 239 (drawing on insights from behavioral
and psychological studies to demonstrate the potential for bargaining failure under liability
rules).
279. See id. at 243-44 ("Since potential takers under liability rules can usually keep all
the gains for themselves and do not face the risk of rejection from owners, they have little
incentive to offer owners an acceptable compromise in the bargaining stage."); see also id. at
257 (predicting that offers of unacceptable compensation may lead, in turn, to "inevitable
rejections by owners, the failure of the negotiation stage, and the subsequent need for co-
erced transfers"); Merges, supra note 121, at 1305 (noting that in the IP context, a liability
rule acts as a ceiling on valuation because it only allows for bargaining downward from the
liability rule).
280. See supra notes 252-259 and accompanying text (discussing the difference be-
tween debiasing and insulating techniques).
281. See Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing, supra note 4, at 14 (referring to Rachlinski
and Jourden's study as "[m]ost important for this article"); Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note
139, at 1574-76 (arguing that the endowment effect may not apply if the entitlement in ques-
tion is protected with a liability rule rather than a property rule).
282. See Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 139, at 1574-76.
283. See, e.g., Arlen, supra note I1, at 1779 n.53 (highlighting the need for further
analysis of the impact of remedies on the endowment effect); Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 7,
at 222 (noting that Rachlinksi and Jourden's study involved environmental amenity entitle-
ments as opposed to IP entitlements, and suggesting that further empirical work could shed
light on the effect of liability and property rules in the IP context).
284. See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 5, at 254 (listing various reasons why Rach-
linski and Jourden's argument should be viewed skeptically).
[Vol. 18:117
The Endowment Effect in IP Transactions
property rules regime than under a liability rules regime. 28 5 She reasons that
property rules focus attention on the profits of an exchange rather than the
loss because owners only sell entitlements voluntarily. Under a liability rule
regime, the pain of selling would be greater because a transaction is (or can
be) forced upon an unwilling owner inducing an attitude of resistance. 286 In
any event, Rachlinski and Jourden's study may not be relevant to the case of
IP entitlements because it studied environmental entitlements. 287 The sub-
jects participating in the study may have believed it would be improper to
sell an environmental resource that one can protect under a property rule
regime, which may be the cause of the observed endowment effect.288 Un-
der liability rule protection, such a belief was undermined "because the
law permitted the destruction of the resource for a price."289 It is not clear,
then, whether the results of Rachlinski and Jourden's study even suggest
that liability rules will reduce the endowment effect generally, or whether
the results are only relevant to situations in which "high WTA prices under
property rules reflect a community perception that selling that type of enti-
tlement is immoral-a perception that could be weakened by protecting the
entitlement with only a liability rule."290
B. Formalities
The Writers also suggest imposing various "formalities" in connection
with copyright law in order to limit the effect of property-rule remedies em-
ployed thereunder to works that meet a substantial valuation threshold.
Their claim is that for copyrighted and patented works with significant
commercial value, parties may use tools such as "running royalties"
285. Id. at 222, 251.
286. Id. at 254. But see Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1285-86 (critically noting that Lew-
insohn-Zamir appears to compare entitlement owners under a property rule regime who wish
to sell, on the one hand, to entitlement owners under a liability rules regime who do not wish
to sell, on the other, and suggesting that there may be as many owners under a property rules
regime with no interest in selling as under a liability rule regime). At least in the context of
IP licensing, as explained above, it seems likely that most owners will want to "sell" due to
high transaction demand. See supra notes 95-104 and accompanying text; see also Liberman
et al., supra note 59 (supporting Lewinsohn-Zamir's thesis by showing that a "promotion fo-
cus," in contrast to a "prevention focus," lowers the endowment effect).
287. Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 139, at 1561-66.
288. See generally Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 139 (discussing the "disutility of
selling" explanation for the endowment effect).
289. See Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1285 (concluding that "the results may have been
driven by what the choice of remedies says about society's commitment to the environ-
ment").
290. Id.; see also Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 7, at 222 (noting that absent the societal
commitment to environmental amenities, for which people often demand a great deal, it re-
mains possible that the choice between property and liability rules would not have the same
impact on WTA versus WTP).
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arrangements291 to reduce the effect of valuation anomalies. In other cas-
es, the Writers argue, the value of the transaction may not be high enough
to warrant the expenses accrued by the use of such tools, and therefore IP
law's property-like protection should not be available. 292 The Writers
acknowledge, however, that in light of international obligations, the United
States is "not free ... to reintroduce to copyright law the traditional formalities
... which remove all rights in a work upon a finding of noncompliance." 29 3
Therefore, as a substitute, the Writers suggest revising copyright law's reme-
dies in order to construct "an effective liability rule" for unregistered-and
hence, low-value-works:2 94 they propose conditioning the availability of
disgorgement and injunctive relief upon timely registration of the work.295
While the Writers acknowledge that reintroducing formalities into copy-
right law may be problematic due to international obligations, they fail to
examine the substantive costs associated with formalities. One such cost
concerns the numerous works that generate high social value but low private
value, and that upon the introduction of costly formal screens may cease to
be produced.2 96 This cost would continue to exist, even if the 'punishment'
for the untimely registration is not a complete deprivation of copyright law,
but merely a deprivation of the remedies of disgorgement and injunctive re-
lief. Another cost of the suggested reform is that it may result in arbitrary
and unjust forfeitures of remedies in cases where non-compliance with the
formal registration requirement is unintentional. 297
A different problem with the Writers' suggestion is that in cases
where the additional copyright formalities are not met, they suggest de-
priving the owner entirely of the important remedies of disgorgement and
injunctive relief. This means that if, for example, the copyright owner of a
literary work who has not met the timely registration requirement were to
sue another person who copied her work without permission, a court
291. A "running royalty" is an arrangement in which periodic payments are made ac-
cording to some percentage of sales or revenues. Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing, supra
note 4, at 36 (noting that such arrangement "is a way of effectively 'agreeing to disagree'
over the value" of the work at hand).
292. Id. at 37-38.
293. Id. at 40.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 41-42.
296. See Jonathan S. Masur & David Fagundes, Costly Intellectual Property, 64 VAND.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 48), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1441987 ("Costly screens would select against low private value, high social value copy-
rights, causing society to bear the losses that result when such works go unproduced."); see
also id. (manuscript at 53) (adding that "[t]he costlier the screen, the more likely it is that au-
thors will decline to create works [when] they are skeptical of clearing the value of the
screen").
297. Cf H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 143-44 (1976) ("One of the strongest arguments for
revision of the present statute has been the need to avoid arbitrary and unjust forfeitures now
resulting from unintentional or relatively unimportant omissions or errors in the copyright
notice").
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could not grant injunctive relief against the imitator, even though the en-
dowment effect has nothing to do with this scenario. In other words, even
if the so-called endowment effect "problem" exists, the Writers' recom-
mendation appears to be overly broad, affecting situations not even
potentially caused by the endowment effect.
C. Fair Use
Buccafusco and Sprigman also suggest utilizing doctrines like fair use
to allow secondary uses that would not otherwise have been permitted in the
presence of an endowment effect.298 In their words, as part of the fair use
analysis, "courts should consider whether a license for the use at issue ...
would likely be subject to significant endowment effects," and in such cases,
a finding of fair use is more appropriate.2 99
Treating a certain use as a fair use and allowing such a use just because
a gap exists between the price demanded by the seller (WTA) and the price
that the licensee is willing to pay (WTP) is not justified. As explained
above, the gap between WTA and WTP can be caused by a variety of fac-
tors, and the WTP value is not always the correct measure.300 It is not
necessarily more efficient, in every situation where the WTA of one party is
higher than the WTP of the other party, to allocate the entitlement to the lat-
ter.30' In this context, it is worth pointing out that the (theoretical) WTA
value of the potential user may be higher than her (current) WTP value. For
instance, a consumer of music might place a higher value on the right to
make copies of a purchased CD once she owns such a right.302 Such WTA
value may exceed or fall beneath the value that the music producer currently
assigns to her right to prevent copying, and this may have different implica-
tions on the question of what is considered the most efficient allocation of
the right. Because there are multiple unknown parameters, some scholars
have gone so far as to argue that fair use jurisprudence must rely altogether
on values other than efficiency. 03
298. Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing, supra note 4, at 42-44. The fair use doctrine in
copyright law authorizes courts to perform a case-by-case determination of whether a partic-
ular use of a copyrighted work that would otherwise constitute an infringement is
nevertheless a fair use and therefore exempt from liability. See also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2011).
299. Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing, supra note 4, at 44.
300. See supra notes 139-147 and accompanying text. See also Korobkin, supra note 8,
at 665-66 (arguing that neither WTA nor WTP is the most appropriate measure of value in
all situations).
301. In order to determine the most efficient allocation in a given case, there is actually
a need to determine both parties' WTA and WTP values as well as the cause of the gap for
each. See generally Korobkin, supra note 8, at 664-83.
302. See Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Posses-
sion, 51 OmIo ST. L.J. 517, 545-46 (1990).
303. See id. at 558.
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Furthermore, fair use is an all or nothing solution.3 " Under the fair use
doctrine, the user who is permitted to make the fair use does not have to pay
the copyright owner anything for such use. This seems, again, like an exces-
sive response to the endowment effect problem. Even if there is a
WTA/WTP gap, and even supposing WTP is the right measure, allowing the
use under the fair use doctrine means that even a lower price will not be
paid to the owner. There is no justification for such a result.
Another problematic aspect of the fair use solution is that the fair use
doctrine requires a case-by-case determination by courts.3 0 In practice, it is
unrealistic to expect that courts would be able to determine whether a li-
cense is likely to be subject to significant endowment effects in a specific
case. In any given case, the endowment effect is just one of multiple factors
that may contribute to the valuation of an entitlement. 306 Moreover, as ex-
plained above, the endowment effect itself may be the result of various
factors, only some of which necessarily warrant correction. 307 Requiring
courts to perform such inquiries on a case-by-case basis would not only add
costs to IP litigation, but also might result in errors that would impose a
high cost on society by reducing incentives to create.
D. Ownership
In order to deal specifically with the so-called "creativity effect," the
Writers also suggest restructuring the rules pertaining to initial ownership of
IP to increase instances where initial ownership vests "in some person or
firm other than the creator."308 Their hope is that "transacting will be more
efficient when rights to creative goods are in the hands of intermediaries"
rather than authors or inventors. 309
Once again, even if their suggestion appropriately mitigated the en-
dowment effect, absent from their discussion is an examination of their
proposal from other relevant perspectives. Taking ownership away from the
creator and vesting it in a different entity may have a significant negative ef-
304. See, e.g., O'Rourke, supra note 264, at 1188 (noting that a successful fair use de-
fense imposes a "royalty-free compulsory license" on the copyright owner).
305. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L.
REV. 1483 (2007) (suggesting the adoption of nonexclusive safe harbors that define mini-
mum levels of copying as per se fair uses).
306. Other factors may include, for example, strategic reasons or anti-competitive mo-
tives.
307. See supra Part IV.B.
308. Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity, supra note 4, at 49. The Writers note that in
the copyright context, this means revisiting the scope of the rules governing whether a par-
ticular work is treated as a work made for hire, while in the patent context, this means
reconsidering the current law's strict inventorship requirement.
309. Id. at 48-49.
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fect on incentives to create.310 It may also undermine other goals that under-
gird our IP system, in particular the desire to provide just reward for labor
and to enable individuals to develop their personality.31"
It is not even clear that following this shifting-ownership suggestion
would achieve its desired effect of mitigating the endowment effect. In gen-
eral, there is only a limited amount of evidence regarding whether the
endowment effect is as strong for agents as for principals involved in a
transaction.312 While the second study conducted by the Writers indicates
that creators may have a higher degree of optimism than mere owners with
respect to the potential commercial success of the work, this study is not
necessarily representative of real life situations where the inventive or crea-
tive activity is sponsored by another entity. The sponsor in some cases may
not even want to commercialize the work, e.g., when she ordered the work
in order to use it in a private manner for a specific purpose. If ownership is
shifted to the creator's employer, it is not clear that the employer will have a
lesser degree of optimism with respect to the commercialization of the work
than the individual creator. The employer is often invested in the work in
many ways that may cause her to similarly attach a high price to the work.
Inasmuch as emotional attachment constitutes an important factor affecting
the valuation of IP goods,"' such an attachment can be developed by an
owner even if she did not create the work herself.314
Finally, the Writers propose to restructure the work made for hire doc-
trine in copyright law as a default rule, vesting initial ownership in the
hands of the sponsor whenever authorship involves non-de-minimis spon-
sorship, subject only to an agreement by the parties to the contrary."' The
Writers make a similar suggestion with respect to patent law.316 In making
such proposals, however, they overlook the possibility that the very effect
they focus on, the endowment effect, may create "stickiness" of such default
rules: the parties may view the default arrangement as a status quo endow-
ment and fail to contract around it even if it is not the most efficient
310. See John P. Sutton, The Inventor's Interest, in PATENT POLIcy: GOVERNMENT, Ac-
ADEMIC, AND INDUSTRY CONCEPTS 150, 152-53 (Willard Marcy ed., 1978) ("It is the
inventor who is to be encouraged, not the investor of mere money.").
311. See supra notes 244-246 and accompanying text (presenting these considerations
derived from labor and personality theories); see also Cherensky, supra note 210 (discussing
in detail the personhood interest of employee-inventors in their inventions).
312. Cf Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1241 n.76 (noting that empirical research is badly
needed on the question of whether corporate decisions are generally as affected by the en-
dowment effect as individual decisions).
313. See supra Part IV.B.l.
314. See Tur-Sinai, supra note 125, at 28 (noting the possibility that an owner of an in-
vention by assignment would gradually develop, as a result of her business and commercial
uses of it, a personality interest in such invention, especially if the public recognizes her as
the owner of said invention).
315. Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity, supra note 4, at 49.
316. Id. at 50.
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arrangement.317 This seems a particularly likely result in the context of
employment contracts in light of the inherent inequity of bargaining power
between the parties.
CONCLUSION
This Article contains a critical analysis of Buccafusco and Sprigman's
recent Studies exploring the existence of the endowment effect in IP trans-
actions. The analysis leads to the conclusion that the Studies do not provide
sufficient justification for the normative proposals made by the Writers.
As set forth in this Article, the novelty and importance of the empirical
findings are overstated. The experimental setting used fails to mimic real
markets for IP goods and thus the effects observed in the Studies are not
representative of real life problems.
Yet, even if the endowment effect did affect owners' and creators' valu-
ations of creative goods, it would not constitute sufficient ground for legal
intervention. A major consideration in this regard is the reason the endow-
ment effect exists in the first place. While the Writers assert that emotional
attachment has very little to do with the high valuations of creators, this Ar-
ticle shows that such attachment is actually likely to have a significant
impact on creators' pricing decisions. Thus, "debiasing" cannot be justified.
A legal system that does not respect the special bond that develops between
a creator and her work acts against some of the major goals that IP law is
designed to promote.
An additional factor that appears to affect creators' and owners' valua-
tion of IP goods is over-optimism. While the Writers view such
over-optimism as a mistake that needs to be corrected, this Article claims
that over-optimism may prove useful in securing the desired level of incen-
tives to develop creative goods. Moreover, over-optimism is likely to correct
itself in the dynamic bargaining process that takes place in the market,
thereby rendering any external intervention unwarranted.
The Article also examines the specific proposals made in the Studies and
finds them wanting. Even if there were grounds for legal intervention arising
out of the Studies, the specific proposals made by the Writers are overbroad
and not sufficiently tailored to address the specific problem supposedly posed
by the endowment effect. Adopting such proposals may instead result in an in-
efficiently reduced level of IP protection to the detriment of society and the
creators of IP goods alike.
317. See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 COR-
NELL L. REv. 608, 612 (1998) ("[C]ontracting parties view default terms as part of the status
quo, and they prefer the status quo to alternative states, all other things equal."); see also id.
at 665 ("[The] status quo bias makes it impossible to be sure that the failure to contract
around the default rule signifies that the default term is efficient for the parties, even absent
transaction costs and private information.").
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Notwithstanding the critical observations set forth above, the experi-
mental Studies conducted by Buccafusco and Sprigman constitute a
promising beginning for a line of research considering the interplay between
the endowment effect and IP law. In presenting a critique of the Writers'
Studies and analysis while suggesting various follow-on experiments,m8 this
Article seeks to contribute to the scholarly effort advanced by the Writers.
318. See supra notes 55, 91, 196; supra text accompanying notes 70-71, 77.
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